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This paper takes the noncooperative approach to study repeated bilateral bargaining 
problems. Extending traditional bargaining models, we allow two players to bargain for 
a number of times. Each bargaining opportunity is called a bargaining stage. In each 
stage, the bargaining is conducted according to the alternating-offer procedure and the 
stage game will end if consensus or deadline is reached. 
By the number of stage and the number of period until deadline, we will analyze four 
cases separately: (i) finite-period, finite-stage bargaining; (ii) finite-period, infinite-stage 
bargaining; (iii) infinite-period, finite-stage bargaining and (iv) infinite-period, infinite-
stage bargaining. We have found the three results: (i) when the number of stage is finite, 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is unique; (ii) For finite stage models, if the number 
of period is odd, the first mover must have advantage. However, if the number of period is 
even, it is the second mover having the advantage if both players are patient enough; (iii) 
using the concept of global stability, we could reduce the set of subgame perfect equilibrium 
for infinite stage models. 
When we are to relax the convexity restriction on the bargaining set, we find that in 
infinite-stage models, we can induce long-run equilibrium outcomes that do not belong to 
the feasible set in stage game. To further investigate the implication, we will analyze the 
cases where bargainers having risk loving attitude and indomitable character. The former 
would retain the uniqueness of perfect equilibrium while the latter would not. Although, in 
the latter case, the multiplicity of equilibria is rather uninteresting, there are two interesting 
results if we restrict our attention to stationary strategy: (i) the set of stationary strategy 
SPE is finite; (ii) in asymmetric stationary SPE, first mover advantage would not disappear 
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1 Introduction 
Bargaining is a struggle between cooperation and competition. Two parties must cooperate 
in order to produce surplus, or a "cake", as they could not do so by themselves alone. 
However, they have competition over the share of the surplus because in most of the cases 
more for one player would mean less for another player. If they can increase their own 
share without hurt the other side at the same time, what and why they are bargaining? 
Hence, two bargaining parties must have common interest and conflicting interest at the 
same time. 
Traditional bargaining literature focuses on what division should be (as in axiomatic 
approach) and how the outcome of negotiation is reached (as in strategic approach). Under 
strategic approach, bargaining is usually modeled as a one-shot, extensive form game. To 
model long-term cooperation, one could simply model the whole period interaction as one 
game. Then, the surplus would represent the total benefit of whole period. In this sense, 
the sharing scheme which has been agreed at the beginning is fixed and cannot change even 
if both sides want to make amendment. Hence, the partition of surplus is rigid and not 
changeable during the whole period. Moreover, it would be hardly optimal for two sides 
to sign a long-term contract even if they know every single detail of each other. Usually, 
the environmental changes, implementation' and changes of preference might prove the 
cooperation is not beneficial to both sides. Therefore, such approach might not adequately 
include important elements such as re-negotiation, inter-temporal tradeoff and dynamic 
interaction. 
This might explain why international trade negotiation is usually not completed in one 
setting but in phases. The best example is the Ministerial Conference of World Trade 
1 Contracts, especially of long-term, might need some adjustments as implementation usually reflect 
inadequacies in earlier conception process. 
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Organization held every two years. Twenty-four months is enough for a great change in 
the business and political environment so that a new round of negotiation is needed as 
some infeasible agreements in the past might be feasible now and some agreements made 
in the past might not be suitable to continue. A local example would be the mainland 
and Hong Kong closer economic partnership arrangement (CEPA). The negotiation of the 
agreement is not done in one setting but in several phases. The first agreement was reached 
in 2003 and the subsequent talks are held while the liberation measure of previous phases 
are at work. Initial implementation are those business sectors without huge obstacles and 
later phases are for more complicated and technical industries. In this way, both sides 
could learn experience during the implementation, and develop trust and experience to 
work with other parties on issues with greater conflict. Another famous example is United 
States annual consideration to grant the most favor nation (MFN) status to China in 1990s 
.Although two countries have not directly discuss the matter on the table directly, both 
governments actually did undertake a under-table bargaining and an implicit bargaining 
where various performances of Chinese government including democratic progress are taken 
into the consideration of the granting of MFN status. This kind of annually revision of 
cooperation status is protecting interest of the strong side like a protecting clause in a 
contract signed between a strong producer and a weak seller because the strong side can 
unilaterally cancel the contract but no the weak side. 
Election system in fact is a negotiation and renegotation process, which could be mod-
eled as repeated bargaining. If we view the election process as a bargaining game between 
the political party and general public, democratic multi-party system is indeed a repeated 
bilateral bargaining with outside option of selecting other parties. One of the reasons for 
presidential and congressional elections to be held every few years is to ensure no one 
could continue to grasp the political power without continuous approval from the people 
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of general public so that powerless individuals are protected against any unjustified action 
from powerful government. In the same vein, corporation with many shareholders would 
have the rights to choose the members of board of directors to represent their interest in 
the company. 
We could hardly incorporate these interactive elements unless we are to model the 
long-term interaction as repeated game. With future cooperation opportunities, players 
might make strategic concession today in return for future concession from other parties 
tomorrow. Making commitments, tax cut and lax welfare policy are common tactics used 
by the ruling party during the election year. Although it might be unwise to adopt such 
strategy if we only consider the present payoff, winning the election would mean the total 
payoff increased and hence it might be wise after all. Therefore, concept of efficiency would 
be completely different as players would view the whole sequence of bargaining rather than 
thinking continuation of bargaining under certain probability.^ 
Another important implication is that outcomes which are infeasible in one-shot bar-
gaining could be achieved in multi-stage bargaining when the restriction of convex feasible 
set is relaxed. In real-life negotiation, there are many occasions in which the feasible set 
is non-convex. In student dormitory, each roommate would be responsible for cleanliness 
of the room shared with roommates. From standard bargaining theory, we would predict 
each student would have do his own task each day/' However, we would rarely see this kind 
of arrangement. Instead of sharing of daily tasks, students would take turn to complete 
the whole task each day partly because it is more efficient in terms of actually doing the 
job and monitoring of the task.'i Borrowing terminologies from theory of production, the 
'2 The continuation conception is a classical view of one-shot game. The discount factor is treated to be 
the combination of continuation probability and degree player's patience. 
3 One might suggest that the surplus could be consider as whole period gain such that each one doing 
one day is the prediction from theory. However, if we are to interpret this way, we would assume the player 
has entered a long-term contract without any chance of withdrawal. 
.1 Isn't it easier to check a job has been done by person in charge than part of the task has been completed 
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fixed cost of doing the simple duty is quite high compared to variable cost. Then, it is 
not optimal for all of the roommates to do the task in parts at the same time. If each 
one alternatively does all the tasks that day, the cost would be lowest for all. Hence, with 
the increasing marginal return to scale, the feasible set is non-convex such that by division 
of labor across time, students could achieve the agreement which is not feasible if they 
are to cooperate once only.' This kind of efficient argument could also be applied to give 
an explanation to the division of labour between each functional department in modern 
corporation. 
Our model would be built on the foundation of alternating-offer bargaining model by 
Stahl(1972) and Rubinstein(1982). As strategic models, they allow each player make a 
proposal to another player who could accept or reject it. Acceptance would end the game 
and the surplus would be divided according to the agreement while rejection would allow 
the other party to make a counter-offer to be proposed after certain period of time. The 
only difference is that the former imposes exogenous pre-determined deadline by which the 
game ends automatically if there is no agreement reached and the latter allows bargaining 
to continue forever unless consensus is being reached. We call such bargaining game as 
a bargaining stage. Following Muthoo (1995)，our models of repeated bargaining would 
simply infinitely repeatedly playing the bargaining stage but with one special adjustment. 
Except the very first stage where one player is picked as the first mover, the first proposer of 
each stage would be the one who have accepted the offer from other player in the previous 
stage. 
by the one responsible? 
5 In the first presentation of this paper, Prof. Kwong has pointed out the problem why players do not 
wish to draw lottery but to bargain over the work. He has suggested it might be due to mechanism design 
problem. My point of view is that ex ante efficiency and ex post efficiency should be treated differently in 
one-shot game and in repeated game. In one-shot game, the former might be more important. However, 
in repeated game, the latter is more important given players might regret and refuse to follow the lottery 
outcome. 
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Combining the idea from Stahl, Rubinstein and Muthoo, we established a family of 
repeated bargaining models with two parameters: the number of period in each bargaining 
stage, denoted by z and the number of bargaining stage, denoted by n. By finiteness of 
the parameters, we would analyze four models: (i) finite-period, finite-stage bargaining 
G (n, z); (ii) finite-period, infinite-stage bargaining G (n, oo); (iii) infinite-period, finite-
stage bargaining G (oo, z) and (iv) infinite-period, infinite-stage bargaining G (00,00). 
For finite stage models (n < 00), it represents the situations that both players know 
when their relationship must end. The surprising result is that the uniqueness of perfect 
equilibrium outcome still retains even when each model can last forever without deadline 
{z < 00). In Stahl's model, we know that when the number of period remaining until 
deadline is an odd number, the purposer might be having less than one-half of the surplus, 
contrary to the first-mover advantage. We call such effect the last-mover advantage. When 
the model is extended to model finitely repeated interaction, similar result that the first 
mover might not be able enjoy the advantage, which compels the other player to succumb 
to tougher terms, still valid. Another parallel result to Stahl's model is that the equilibrium 
offers decrease as the stage game approach deadline. However, as the remaining number 
of stage reduces, the offers might not drop due to the last-mover advantage. 
For infinite stage models (n = 00), no matter there is deadline in bargaining situation, 
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is not unique. This result follows directly 
from folk theorem that any feasible and individual rational outcome could be supported. 
As the worst outcome is disagreement with zero payoff (which we normalized it to be)，any 
outcome could be supported by the threat to return to the worst outcome. To refine the 
set of SPEs, we have applied global stability and successfully eliminated those extremal, 
counter-intuitive outcomes. Another useful, though straightforward result is that by infi-
nite repetition of the bargaining game, outcomes outside the original feasible set but within 
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the convexified feasible set could be supported as subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Although the multiplicity problem associated with non-convex bargaining reduce the 
predicative power of the deduction, we will try to analyze two simple situations which 
are common in practice. The first case is that bargainers have increasing marginal utility 
or they are are risk-lovers. To model the increasing return, one could not count on the 
traditional bargaining model but have to adopt the behavioral assumption. The second 
case is an "upgraded" version of the first one: players are indomitable in the sense that the 
bargainers are eager to get more than 50% of the surplus.'' Usually, even when we know 
that at the weak position, few of us would be happy that we are getting less than one-half 
of the surplus. Even in ultimatum game', player would reject offer of 30% because "they 
would rather forgo some money than be treated unfair". 
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed literature review. 
Section 3 will discuss the model setup. Section 4 and section 5 will characterize the 
equilibrium for finite stage model and infinite stage model respectively. Section 6 would 
discuss the two special non-convex examples. Section 7 investigates the application of 
various models. Section 8 contains a summary and concluding remarks. 
61 must admit that the present model might not capture all the dynamics of indomitability. One 
important component has ignored in bargaining model is the implementation problem. Without perfect 
monitoring, if one is getting less, he might make less effort in the cooperation phases. Though such kind of 
behavior would have no effect on one-shot bargaining, they do have important implication if both parties 
are to cooperate in the future. 
7 See [ ] for a detailed meta-analysis on the experimental results in ultimatum game. 
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2 Literature Review 
Although bargaining is one of important components in transaction process广 economists 
have said very little about it until the recent 60 years. It was perhaps theorists lacked 
of analytical skills to develop models for agents with conflict of interest. Interactive deci-
sion theory, probably except Cornot, was not available for solving the dynamic situation 
inherent in bargaining before 1950s. One may, therefore, suggest that the development 
of bargaining theory should be highly correlated to the development of game theory and 
indeed both two theories made great progress at the same time. 
The first formal work in bargaining theory probably could be traced to Nash. He solved 
the problem using two approaches: (i) cooperative axiomatic approach and (ii) noncoop-
erative strategic approach. In the first approach [ ], he characterized the unique solution 
by four axioms. The second approach [ ] is the so-called Nash demand game where each 
player simultaneously making offers with threat. Nash believed the two approaches were 
complementary to each other and he had implemented the axiomatic solution by using the 
strategic approach." 
The development of axiomatic approach mainly focuses on the selection of more general 
and less restrictive axioms. Particularly, due to problems with the axiom of independent 
of irrelevant alternatives, various alternative solution concepts are proposed. The most 
popular two alternatives are egalitarian solution [ ] and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [ ] . 
Of course, three of them are similar solution concepts and they only differ in the choice of 
set of axioms'". For further discussion on them, refer to [ ] . 
8 Other components can be searching and matching. 
9 Though Nash acknowledged the importance of implementation of the axiomatic solution by strategic 
setup, the setup of Nash demand game is too artificial and fails to incorporate the essential dynamic 
ingredient in bargaining. It would not be surprising to expect that after the seminal work by Rubinstein, 
numerous works on implementation come out. Binmore, et. al [?] implements the nash solution using the 
alternating-offer bargaining procedure and theories on implementing various setting of bargaining models 
are still in active research. 
10 Nash solution requires the equilibrium distribution to be weakly better than other options and adopts 
7 
Even though Nash demand game is artificial and unnatural, there is not much devel-
opment in strategic approach until 1970s, though extensive form game has been widely-
available during 1950s. Stahl developed the first strategic finite-horizon bargaining model 
using backward induction in 1970s and Rubinstein has developed the infinite-horizon coun-
terpart in 1980s. Most of subsequent papers adopted Rubinstein's model as basic skeleton. 
One of the most remarkable result of Rubinstein model is the uniqueness of perfect equi-
librium. Unfortunately, the uniqueness property seems sensitive to the assumptions. For 
example, when van Damme, Selten and Winter [ ] and Muthoo [ ] breaks down the con-
tinuity in the feasible set, every possible agreement can be support as SPE if players are 
patient enough or time lag between offers and counteroffers are short enough. Binmore [ ] 
extended the analysis of Rubinstein to general feasible set. He has applied the concept of 
iterated deletion of conditional dominated strategy to characterize the set of containing 
SPE. Until now, for non-convex bargaining, there is not much development in strategic 
approach but there are quite a few paper in axiomatic approach. 
As an extension to standard bargaining model, possibly Fershtman [ ] was the first 
to consider multi-issue 丨 b a r g a i n i n g though bargainers would cease their relationship after 
agreements on several issues reached. He considered three cases: (i) payoff is obtained 
immediately after an agreement is reached; (ii) payoff is realized only after agreements 
on all issues in agenda is reached; and (iii) stream of payoff could be obtained after an 
agreement is reached but would cease if there is no final consensus in all issues in the 
axioms of efficiency, symmetry, scale invariance and contraction independence. Egalitarian solution requires 
the distribution to be equal among players and uses axioms of weak efficiency, strong symmetry and 
contraction independence. Kalai-Smorodinsky solution requires the ratio of ideal point to the equilibrium 
distribution to be equal among players and uses axioms of weak efficiency, strong symmetry, scale invariance 
and weak contraction independence. 
" I n theory, multi-issue bargaining and repeated bargaining are same except the realization of payoff and 
bargaining opportunity. In most multi-issue bargaining models, the payoff is realized only after all issues 
on the agenda has reached and all bargaining opportunities are known. In repeated bargaining, the payoff 
is realized immediately but the bargaining opportunity only appears after the previous bargaining problem 
is settled. 
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agenda. He claimed that only the second cases is the only interesting case to analyzed as 
the first case is just a trivial extension as each issue could be treated independently and 
the result of third case is similar to second one. Later, Muthoo [ ] worked on the first 
case with a little change on how the repetition is done and found out the result is not 
so trivial. In his model, the time lag between offers and counteroffer in bargaining might 
not be the same as the time lag between conclusion of one bargaining and initiation of 
the new one. In effect, he has extended the Rubinstein model by infinitely repeating the 
alternating-offer bargaining model and the result obtained is different from the standard 
Rubinstein solution because bargaining across stages are interdependent. Since the model 
is in fact a repeated game, he has found out that the set of non-stationary equilibria indeed 
include all the outcomes in feasible set, which is similar to the result from folk theorem. 
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3 Model 
Denote the two bargainers by player A and player B. Two players would have opportunities 
to enter n bargaining situations. We call each bargaining situation a bargaining stage. 
Usually we would assume all stages are identical and each stage lasts for z periods�"' Hence, 
we can describe the family of repeated bargaining model by G (n, z) using two parameters: 
(i) G (n, z) finite stage, finite period model ； (ii) G (n, oo) finite stage, infinite period model; 
(iii) G (oo, z) infinite stage, finite period model and (iv) G (oo, oo) infinite stage, infinite 
period model. We will discuss each models according to the following schedule in shown 
Table 1. 
Stage\Period Finite Infinite 
Finite Section 4.1 Section 4.2 
Infinite Section 5.1 Section 5.2 
Table 1: Schedule of discussion of four models 
Each stage proceeds according to the alternating offer procedure. Except the very first 
bargaining stage where player A is assumed to be the first proposer, if player A accepts 
player B's offer in the previous stage, player A would be the first mover next stage, and 
vice versa." If a player accepts other's proposal, the present bargaining stage (A;th stage) 
12 Here, the opportunity is used because for bargaining without deadline, the stage game would no end 
if no consensus is reached. The number of bargaining stages n might be finite or infinite. When we say n 
is finite, we mean that each bargainer would expect their cooperative relationship ends after n agreements 
are reached. For infinite n, we mean each bargainer would expect not think their relationship terminate in 
foreseeable future. 
13 Here, we assume the stage is same across stages and its duration is counted in discrete period of time. 
This setting is enough for most practical purpose. 
Each bargaining stage could last for finite time (finite :，or bargaining with deadline) or infinite time 
(infinite z, or bargaining without deadline). When we model the situation as finite horizon bargaining, it 
means that both players have clear idea that bargaining would end in the foreseeable future if they do not 
reach agreement soon enough. There are many cases bargaining would end in a certain period of time, 
especially in most political bargaining. When we adopt infinite horizon bargaining model, it means that 
both bargainers expect bargaining would not end in foreseeable future or they do not think the bargaining 
opportunity would end before they reach the agreement. 
‘‘‘This setup follows Muthoo [ ]. There is a little subtlety when rejection appear in the last round for 
finite horizon bargaining because there are two possible way to assign who is the first proposer in next 
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ends and the next stage ((k + l)th stage) would start after time t “ � a s long as the final 
stage has not been reached, that is k + I < n. However, if the player rejects the offer， 
after time A, he could make an counteroffer. Hence, both players are sequentially making 
offers and counteroffers to each other with time lag A until either one agrees with other's 
proposal. After an agreement is reached, the next stage would start after time 丁. 
Formally, each stage itself is a bargaining problem and we denote the kth stage bargain-
ing problem by XkU{dk} where X^ be the set of feasible agreements and dk be disagreement 
outcome in kth bargaining stage. “）Usually, we would assume there is underlying conflict 
of interest between players, that is, given a sharing scheme, if player A has to increase his 
own share, player B must decrease eventually, and vice versa. Otherwise, both player could 
get infinite amount surplus. One consequence of this assumption is that when player A is 
getting the highest possible share of surplus in A;th stage, player B is getting the lowest 
possible share of surplus in that stage. 
Repeated bargaining model G (n, z) is n stages bargaining problems joined together 
sequentially and we denote it by [Xk U {dk}}k=i- To simplify the problem, each possible 
agreement is represented by a 2-tuple {xk,yk) G Xk and the perpetual disagreement out-
come is represented by dk = (d^, ds). If a A;-th stage agreement (xfc, yt) is reached at time 
Tk {k is counted from one), the outcome of this stage is denoted as {{xk,yk) ,Tk). Hence, 
denote 
〈(工i’yi) ,Ti,...,(a;n,2/n),Tn) G {Xfc X [0, oo) U {d,oo)} 
stage. One is to allow the last proposer continue to be first proposer. Another one is to let the one who 
rejects the last proposer to be the first proposer. We shall see that both cases would return similar outcome 
in equilibrium if the bargaining period is odd. However, in even period bargaining, the latter assumption 
might lead to strategic delay. In most cases, we will analyze the models under the former assumption as it 
would be much easier. See appendix I for discussion of this assumption and strategic delay. 
15This might represent the time required for both parties to consume the old cake, time required for new 
opportunity to come and time required to come up with new agreement, 
In most paper in the literature, the author simply stated the feasible set is a convex set without stating 
clearly the forms of utility or preference. However, as we wish to break the assumption of convexity, it 
would be better to start from the very beginning. 
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to be the bargaining outcome of n-stage bargaining problem. If we denote tk G [0, zA] be 
the time passed from the beginning of kth stage to the kth stage agreement reached, then 
we have Tk+i = Tk + tk + r = ti + [k — 1) r. Therefore, when we say the offer is make 
in tk/Ath period in A;th stage, we would denote it as (oc]^y^f^么丫 Note that tk must be 
multiple of A and Tk must be sum of multiple of A and multiple of r. 
Assume players' preferences ^^ {i = A, B) satisfy the axioms of complete, transitive, 
independence, continuity and time-invariant. Then, a vNM utility function could be used 
to represent the preference over the outcome space {X^ U {oJfcDfc^i- As the preference 
would be extremely difficult to deal with directly in repeated bargaining, we would assume 
the existence of utility function {U for player A and V for player B) over n bargaining 
stage and the function is separable additively,'^ that is, 
U {{{xuyi) . . . ,Tn)) = C/(((xi,t/i),Ti)) + . . . + C/(((a:n,yn),Tn)) and 
V{{[xuyi),Ti...,{Xr,,yn).Tn)) = V yi) , Ti)) + . . . + F {{{Xn.yn) , Tn)) 
If sum of share of surplus of two players is constant, we could assume each player care his 
own payoff only. Moreover, we also assume separability between effect of time preference 
and outcome preference'"^ and players discount future payoff. Denote r^  > 0 as player i,s 
rate of time preference. Hence, we have 
U i{ixk,yk) ,Tk)) = U{xk )exp { - r iTk )=u l ' and 
y{{{xk,yk),Tk)) = V{yk)exp{-riTk) = vl'. 
17Usually, getting more or less in one round would not affect the preference in subsequent rounds. Each 
bargaining outcome is independent of each other which means players treat previous outcome "sunk". This 
assumption is particularly fit for the case in which time between bargaining rounds are long or bargainers 
would immediate enjoy the payoff after agreement is reached. 
18 See [ ] for the detailed discussion on the condition of the validity of the separability of time and outcome 
preference. 
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To save notation, let 6i = exp ( - r j A ) and ai = exp (-r^r) for i = A,B. Denote Uf the 
possible utility pairs in stage k and at time Tk, that is,… 
uT: -{{ul^y, ')：(�1 (�V冷）’ 1 (”?7役)）e X,]. 
Pareto frontier 母 in stage k and at time Tk would then be 
处 = { 巧 ： t h e r e does not exist (a, b) 6 U^'' such that a > u^" and &〉？;【*=}. 
Sometimes we might need to consider the payoff from the whole game, not just from 
stage game only. Define f = . . . , Tn) be the sequence of time for n agreements reached 
and Tk = (Tfc,..., T„) be the subsequence of time for fcth stage agreements to nth stage 
agreement reached which is a subsequence of T. Similarly, we would let CI? be the set of 
cumulative Pareto Frontiers 
ni" = E 
he{k,..,n},Thefk 
= ‘ E E vA 
\he{k,..,n},Thefk he{k,..,Ti},Thefk J 
= I ••4'二 E � ’ � v t k = E and (ul^ul^) G 
for all h € {A:,.,n} 
Similar to most papers in the literature, we would focus on pure strategy as it is hardly 
Note that for nf^ " and the subscript is to denote the time when the agreement is reached but not 
the power to be raised. 
Thanks for the anonymous external examiner pointed out the definition should be more explicit as in 
the last line of the equation. 
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plausible for players to use randomization device in any practical bargaining situation. As 
in most paper in the literature, we would focus on pure strategy. A strategy is stationary 
if the offering rule and acceptance rule are history-independent, and the same within stage 
and across stages. A strategy is stage-stationary if the offering rule and acceptance rule are 
history-independent, and the same throughout the stage but not necessarily be the same 
across stages. A strategy is stage-period-stationary if the offering rule and acceptance 
rule are history-independent but not necessarily be for different stages and across periods. 
Hence, we would call the history-dependent strategy to be non-stationary.''^  ' Throughout 
this paper, we would adopt the assumption that there exists bijection between payoff and 
strategy.2'2 么； 
21 Compared to literature, our concept of stationarity is more general and liberal. 
think this assumption is rather innocuous because if two strategies are giving the same payoff, there 
is no harm to remove any one of them from our strategy space without affecting any equilibrium except 
the number of equilibrium. 
23Thanks for the anonymous external examiner pointed out that this assumption is not immediately clear 
and further justifications or discussions should be included. The following is my response: 
I still think the assumption is innocuous. First, as we have assumed that bargaining parties should 
have common interest and conflicting interest at the same time (p.l), given the fixed size of surplus, any 
playerOs payoff could be described entirely by his own size of surplus. Since surplus is good to player, the 
payoff function should be non-decreasing function of the size of surplus. Therefore, the only case that the 
assumption of one-to-one relation between payoff and strategy would fail is not strong monotone, or having 
zero marginal utility at certain values of surplus. As size of surplus is the fundamental conflict of interest, 
it is rare case that payoff would not increase as surplus increase. 
Second, even if there is no one-to-one relationship between payoff and strategy, the only consequence is 
that we would have multiple equilibriums. However, this multiplicity is not interesting because this would 
only happen when the equilibrium strategies are lying on the non-increasing continuous interval, which is 
rare and has not much harm to our prediction. For any bargaining model, the most important element 
is outcome of the division of the surplus but not the strategy employed. Hence, the prediction power is 
not harm. Moreover, if two strategies give the same outcome for both parties, should they be called same 
strategies or different strategies? 
Third, even if the uniqueness is broken in the sense described above, if the player with strong monotonic 
preference have enough patience (unless both players are without strong monotonic preference), the multi-
plicity of offering rule would collapse to a unique offering rule. 
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4 Finite Stage Model 
In this thesis, the general technique employed to solve bargaining problem is security 
equilibrium by Binmore [?]. Put it in a less formal manner, it utilizes the method of 
iterated deletion of conditional dominated strategy which is in fact a generalized backward 
induction. (See appendix IV for formal review of the concept.) This fundamental technique 
would be the basic tools to solve for all four models. 
4.1 Stage with deadline: G (n, z) 
Firstly, we would like to show that under the certain restriction on the set of Pareto 
Frontiers Q '^' ‘ for finite stage bargaining, we would have a unique SPE. Surprisingly, 
unlike models without deadline, uniqueness retains even if the feasible set (and hence the 
Pareto frontier) consists only finite number of points.-' One special feature of equilibrium 
of finite stage finite period model is that equilibrium strategy would depend only on stage 
and period of the bargaining but independent of history, which means that any deviation 
by mistake would not lead to off-equilibrium path but delay only. 
Proposition 1 For bargaining problem G (n, z) with [X^ U {c?fc}}fc=i 肌 d preference or-
dering the game has a SPE with immediate agreemer}£:() if and only if the set 
of Pareto Frontiers of satisfy the condition that for each element in there 
exists at least one Pareto superior element in for k < k'，fit < f^o where k'G[0,n] and 
r^/G[0, z]. Furthermore, if for all Tk < T^, every element in ft? are strictly dominated by 
some elements on ，SPE is unique and its strategy is stage-period stationary. 
Note that the set of Pareto frontiers is finite as Tk assumes finite number of values. More precisely, 
there are n x z Pareto frontiers. 
'25 In the paper by E.V, Damme, R. Seltan and E. Winter [ ]，they have shown that in standard Rubinstein 
bargaining game, any outcome (including outcomes with delay and even perpetual disagreement) could be 
supported as perfect equilibrium if players are patient enough. 
26More precisely, we need that for all k < fc'，and all Tk < we have (f^【矢 U C fi^ 
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Proof. To ensure immediate agreement, we must have Tk < T^ for all possible Tj. such 
that all elements in must not be Pareto dominated by any elements in . Otherwise 
player would simply wait and get higher payoff. Then, it is clear that existence of Pareto 
superior element implies immediate agreement. 
For immediate agreement, it means that there is no delay in each round, that is Tk = 
((fc - 1) A , . . . ’ (n — 1) A). Obviously, this implies that all elements in 沧 must be some 
element not Pareto dominated by any element in fi【知 for all ffc > T .^ Therefore, the 
existence of equilibrium of immediate agreement would imply for the existence of Pareto 
superior element. 
Hence, we have established the equivalence of the existence of equilibrium of immediate 
agreement would imply for the existence of Pareto superior element. 
The construction of the equilibrium strategy is straightforward. As Tn is bounded above 
by zA + (n — 1) r, we could apply backward induction. Hence, it suffices to illustrate the 
case of a bargaining game with one stage and n periods as an induction argument using 
backward induction completes the proof for any finite many stages. Since stage game ends 
in time z, one can define 
杆 i ) A = { y ( “ ） y ( 如 ） 昨 } 三 消 f o r a l l i > + 
Hence, we only need to focus on for t < (n + 1) A. Now consider when t = zA, 
since ^ ！^奸”么 contains only disagreement payoff, we could always find outcomes on the 
Pareto frontier Clf^ such that payoff would be better than the disagreement. Among those 
outcomes, we could be able to find a outcome which would maximize the payoff of player 
making the last proposal (if z is even, then it is player A\ otherwise, player B). The reason 
we focus on the frontier alone is because any outcome not on the frontier is not optimal 
for both players. The existence of maxima on the frontier is ensured by the finiteness of 
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frontier (if it consists of discrete point) or compactness of frontier (if it is a connected 
line segment). Similarly, by the assumption of existence of Pareto superior outcome, when 
t = {z — 1) A, we could find a unique point on Pareto frontier Repeating this 
process, we could find a unique point on ft^ which is the unique SPE outcome of the game. 
For uniqueness of equilibrium strategy, it would be ensured by the existence of bijection 
between payoff and strategy. As construction of equilibrium payoff is unique along the 
path of play, we know that the strategy must be stage-period stationary. • 
Intuitively, proposition 1 says that if it is always not worse for any player to accept 
than reject when facing a particular sequences of offers, then that sequence of offers would 
become the perfect equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, if the particular sequence of offer 
is unique, the equilibrium outcomes should be unique. The above proposition just write 
down the technique conditions for the existence and uniqueness of particular sequence of 
offers in terms of set of Pareto frontiers. Carefully looking at the strategy that constitutes 
SPE, we would observe the following fact: 
Remark 1 For one stage bargaining model, G (1, z), a bargainer being the last mover 
could obtain all the surplus. Therefore, proposer could have extra advantage if the number 
of period remaining is odd. We call such effect as last-mover advantage. Moreover, as 
players are impatient, being proposer could also have extra advantage over the other player 
in all cases. We call such effect the first-mover advantage. 
When the number of period of each stage is odd, the first proposer could enjoy the first-
mover advantage and last-mover advantage at the same time. However, when the number 
of period of each stage is even, the first-mover advantage and last-mover advantage do not 
act on the same person. Table 2 summarizes the qualitative effects under different setting 
where +ve means a rise in his equilibrium share while -ve means reduction in equilibrium 
share. 
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Number of Period Even period (odd z) Odd period (even z) 
Role of the player proposer respondent proposer respondent 
first-mover advantage +ve -ve +ve -ve 
last-mover advantage -ve +ve +ve -ve 
Table 2: The qualitative effect of first-mover advantage and last-mover advantage under 
different settings 
Irrespective of even period model or odd period model, we find out that the first-mover 
advantage and last-move advantage would have the following quantitate relationship with 
the patience and the number of period in each stage: 
Quantitate effective more patient player larger number of period 
first-mover advantage reduced enhanced 
last-mover advantage enhanced reduced 
Table 3: The quantitate effect of first-mover advantage and last-mover advantage under 
different settings 
Remark 2 Last-mover advantage would have larger effect when the players are more pa-
tient and number of period in each stage reduces while the first-mover advantage would 
have larger effect when the players are less patient and the number of period in each stage 
increases. 
(Therefore, for infinite period game, one may suggest that the last mover advantage 
approached to zero and only the first mover advantage is observed.) 
In multi-stage game G (n, z) where n > 1, if number of period in next stage is odd, 
respondent is willing to accept the lower offer than otherwise because he can become the 
first mover in the next stage where he can enjoy both first-mover advantage and last-mover 
advantage. If the number of period in next stage is even,the proposer is willing to offer 
more to the respondent if players are sufficiently patient or if surplus in the next stage is 
large enough. It is because the last-mover advantage will be greater than the first mover 
< 
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advantage so that the net effect is that being the first mover is worse than the second 
mover. We would like to call such these concession behaviors solely due to consideration 
of first-mover status as strategic concession. To look into the matter clearly, we would like 
to restrict our attention the standard bargaining problem where players are risk neutral 
and the sum of surplus is a constant. 
Proposition 2 For finite stage bargaining model, G (n, z), suppose that the bargaining 
problem for each stage is standard bargaining problem, that is all Xk is standard unit 
simplex and all d^ are (0,0). We also assumes that that players are risk neutral, U {x) = x 
and V {y) = y, and have same time preference, ta = tb = r.''' Then the set of SPE has 
have the following properties: 
1. the game has only a unique perfect equilibrium offers xl-^^ 
2. If number of period in each stage is odd (z is even) and holding j constant, equilibrium 
offers x*j is non-increasing as i increases. 
3. If number of period in each stage is even (z is odd) and holding j constant, equilibrium 
offers x'-j is non-increasing as i increases if S is sufficiently small or z is sufficiently 
large. If 6 is sufficiently small or z is sufficiently large, the equilibrium offers x*j 
would be fluctuating down and up alternatively as i decreases if n is even and would 
be fluctuating up and down alternatively as i decreases if n is odd. 
4- If number of period in each stage is odd (z is even) and holding i constant, equilib-
rium offers x*j would be fluctuating up and down alternatively as j increases. More 
•precisely, the magnitude of switch is decreasing with time and proportional to 
27The reason for such assumptions is just to keep other factors constant. I believe these restrictions are 
not crucial and conjecture this result should hold for more general case but I lack the time and skill to 
complete the proof. 
28 We denote the equilibrium offers of proposer's share in stage t, period j to be x*j = x^ if it is player 
A makes proposal and x*j = yl if it is player B makes the proposal. 
19 
5. If number of period in each stage is even (z is odd) and holding i constant, equilib-
rium offers would be fluctuating down and up alternatively as j increases. More 
precisely, the magnitude of switch is decreasing with time and proportional to 
Proof. (1) For the proposition 1，it can be seen that the perfect equilibrium outcome is 
unique. 
For any game G (n, z), the last n — 1 stage games should be the same as G {n ~ 1 ,2). 
Therefore, would be the same for all G {n — k, 1) for all A; = 0,1, . . . n — 1. Using 
backward induction, one could easily shown that 
I 1 - <,t = for alH < z 
1 ‘ = 1 
The first equation follows from the equilibrium condition that players should be indifferent 
between acceptance and rejection of the equilibrium offer and the second equation simply 
derived from result of ultimatum game. Solving the systems of z equations, we have 
* — 1 — (—(^―奸 1 
� = y T ~ s ^ • 
In the second to the last stage, that is the (n — l)th stage, using similar reasoning, we 
could have similar conditions: 
‘ 
< 1 - + = +aS{l- :<’o) for a\\t<z 
‘ = 1 
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We are now going to solve the system of equations by solving them using recursive 
substitution of the following equations from z — t io z: 
<~i,z-t = 1 — + a [(1 + S) ：4’0 — s' 
It can be easily shown that 
Now consider third to the last stage, that is the (n - 2)th stage, we could have similar 
conditions: 
1 - <_2’z-t + "< -1 ,0 + (1 - x;_2,o) 
^ = ^<-2,z-t+i + for all t < z 
^n-2,z = 1 
The recursive substitution result is 
<-2,z-t = 1 - ^<-2,z-t+l + « [ ( ! + S) <_1 ,0 - 5] + [1 - (1 + 6) 
= { 1 + a [(1 + (5) < _ i ’ o - 5] + [1 - (1 + S) r<0] } 
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Similarly, the general formula would be 
* I … [ ( … ) < - f c + i ， o “ ] + 
"’ a2 [1 —（1 + 5) + … + [(1 + < ’ o — 句 J if 左 is odd 
Xn-k,z-t = { > � � 1 \ 
l + + if A; is even 
" ’ ' a 2 [1 _ (1 + 5) < — 卿 1 + . . . + a ” l _ (1 + 5) x ;o ] 
V \ L J ^ 
If we let = a ;“’之 - we would have for A; = 1, ...n 
, ( 1 + 5) X；, { a (A<_,+i，o) - ( A < — , + 2 ’ o ) +••• 
** \ 乂 \ ‘ if k IS odd 
, * + (-1广-1 (A<-i,o)} + [(1 + J) < ’ � -习 
(1 + c J ) [ a (ArrJU+i o) - + … . … 
^ ’ 7 \ � ‘ if k IS even 
、 + ( — 1 , - 1 a " ( A < _ i ’ o ) } + [ 1 - ( 1 + J )工 ; 0 ] 
When A: = 1, we have 
^ < - i , z - t = < , t « [(1 + S) < 0 - S 
and when k = 2, we have 
and when k = 3’we have 
= < t {{l + S) [a (Ax;_2,o) - (A<_ i , o ) ] + [(1 + < o " } 
=<,t (1 + (aAx;_2,o - + ^^^ ^<-i,z-t 
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and when A; = 4, we have 
‘ � 
A * . (1 + 5) [a (Ax:;_3,o) - (A<_2,o) + (A<_i,o)] 
=<’t (1 + (^^<-3,0 - + 
and when /d = 5, we have 
A * — . / + (A<_4’。）一 o:2 (A<—3,0) + a3 (AX;_2,O) — (A<_i ,o ) ] 
‘ +a5[(l + 5)<，o-5] J 
=<,t (1 + S) [a (Ax;_4^o) - (A<_3’o)] + 
Hence, for general k, we would have 
= <,t (1 + S) (aA<_知+10 — + for 3 < A; < n 
Consider for A; > 3 
= a [:<’o (1 + S) - a^A^.fc+a.o) + _ 
= t < ’ o (1 + - 1] - [<，o (1 + 5 ) - 1: 
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Hence, for 3 < A; < n, we have 
= (1 + 5) (aArc；；一fc+i，o - + ^K-k+2,z-t 
=<,t (1 + �(—“+2,0 - a2Aa;“+3’o) a [- (-5产]+ 
= < , t (1 + 3) (aA<_2,o - a2A4_i ’o) { a 卜（-<5广+1] + 
By recursive substitution, we would have 
1 - - H f + l . ‘ i ” f c - 3 
[ “ ( � i i ‘ (1 + 5) - 卜 卜 } 
if k is odd 
二 r ，丄 ii(fc-2)/2 ‘ 
1 - - ( - 5 严 r � 』左 - 3 
^ ^L i + ( _ ” 丄 X ； , (1 + d-) (aAx;_2,o - [""”十」} 
if k is even 
Therefore, if we can find out and - (—(5广+i, 
we can determine all the sign of for fc = 1, ...’n. 
(2) We first consider the case of even jz first. Consider and 
= ( 1 + - S ) > 0 
and 
= {a (1 + 6) A<_1,0 + a ' [1 - (1 + S) < o ] } 
= { a 2 (1 + 科 1) (1 + 5奸 1 — 5) + a2 (—妒+1)} 
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Consider 
= « [(1 + 州)(1 “ ) + (<^计1)2] } - a2 (1 + 5州-S)} 
= [ ( l + J 杆 1 - 5 - 5计2 + — (1 + p + i _ 句-
= 杆 2 ( 1 一 … 0 
Hence 
= < , t (1 + ( a A < _ 2 , 0 - + 
= ( 1 + � " 3 (1 - 5 ” + 
= ( 1 + 0 尸+2 (1 - + 以2 (1 + 尸+1 -
= [ ( 1 + J 杆 1 - S ) - ( l + (J计 1) 5抖 2 (1 — 
= [ 1 + (5^ +1 - 5 - 5杆 2 _ 沪钟 3 + 尸+4 + 炉奸 3. 
= [ ( 1 - S ) + 5奸 1 ( 1 - 5 ) 4 - J计4 (1 _ + 奸3: 
> 0 
Finally, it is obvious that — = 杆i > •. 
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We know that for A; > 3, 
V ^ i l ^ ( 1 + ^  奸2 (1 _ 广3 
1 + 6 if A; is odd 
— (1 + 5杆 1 - 5) 
二 < 1 _ r_r^+ii(fc-2)/2 
_ […丄 1 ( 1 + 句[一<,0乂5奸2 (1 - “ ( 仅 妒 + 1 广-3 if k is _ 
知-2：<’一 [(1 + 5-+1) (1 — 5) + (5奸 1)2-
‘ - [ l - SZ+2 (1 _ 5 ” ( 5 州 广 3 
J if k is odd 
=avJ + ( … 〜 ） 
" ’ ' ] — [ 1 — sz+2 (1 _ (5州广3 
L � J if k is even 
+ [(1 + 5抖 1 ) ( 1 - 5 ) + ((^+1)2 
. 一 (1 + 奸 1) (P+2 (1 _ jz) + (1 + if fc is odd 
> Oi^ X* t , 21 
一（1 + (1 一 (P+2 + (1 + (1 _ 5) + � + 1 ) 2 if k is even 
( 1 - 5 ) + 杆 1 ( 1 - 5 ( 1 + 5抖 1) (1 — if k is odd 
= 
if k is even 
> 0 
Hence, for odd period models, ^ • which means that Xij are decreasing in 
i, holding j constant. That is, offers are decreasing across stage holding period constant. 
(3) Now consider the case of odd z. Consider and 
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and 
= {a (1 + 5) A<_ i , o + [1 - (1 + 5) < o ] } 
=<’t (1 + 0 (1 一 5计 1 [ 1 - ( 1 + S) <’o] } 
=< ’ t (1 - 奸 1) (1 - 5计 1 -5)+ 奸 1} 
= 工 ； - 产 i ) ( l “ ) + (<J州)2] 2 0 
It is obvious that can be non-positive if 5 is sufficiently large or z is sufficiently 
small. Consider 
= “ { < ’ 0 « 2 [(1 — (5) (1 - 5州）+ (cJ州)2] } - a2 {x^oa (1 — 5 州 - S ) } 
= 杆 1 + + (J 杆 1)2) _ (1 _ 尸+1 一 句 
= � 3 < ’ 0 “ + 5 : + 2 + ( � ) . 
Hence, 
^<-3,z-t = <,t (1 + S) (aA<_2,o — + 
=<,t (1 + 句 计 2 J (1 + 5” + 
= ( 1 + S) (J抖2 (1 + 5 ” + 工二fQ (1 —尸+1 - S) 
=a^x；^^ [(1 - 5抖 1) 5奸2 (1 + jz) + (1 _ _ 5): 
= { (1 - 5计 1) [5抖2 (1 + 尸)+ 1] 一 
2 7 
Once again, can be non-positive if 6 is sufficiently large or z is sufficiently small. 
Finally, — (-5广十丄=-(f+i < 0. Recall that for A; > 3, we have Ax“，之一* 
‘ [ _ ( — 5 广 + 1 广-”/2 M 
1 _ 尸 + 1 � — — + <�a3<rt"2 (1 + 5 ” 卜[—(-<5)1 广3 
+ a 知 — t a (1 一 <5抖 1 - 5) if A; is odd 
(1 + 5) < ’ � a 3 5 奸 2 (1 + 5 � 卜 产 1 ] 广 3 
知-2:<，ta2 [(1 - (T^i) (1 - (5) + ( ( J 奸 i f k is even 
,—[1 _ 奸 妒 + 2 (1 + 妒)(妒+1 广-3 
� if A: is odd 
_ � 力 [ l — 计 1)(知-2)/2l 尸+2 (1 + q (J奸 1 广3 
L r J 。， if k is even 
、 + (1 — 
Hence, inductively, one could easily show that Arc二—於 is non-negative for even k but 
can be non-positive for odd fc if 5 is sufficiently large or z is sufficiently small. 
Before we prove (4) & (5), it would be useful to recall the formula of a;h^’z-t 
( ( > 
a：* f < L � • 
’ a2 + + - - . + Q^"[(1 + 5 ) < ’ o - 习 if fc is odd 
二 S ? r < 
l + a (1 + J) 0 — + if ^ is even 
< L ， J > 
" ’ ' 1 [l - (1 + 6) :r“+2，ol + + < ’ o ] 
V \ L J / 
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It is immediately clear that 工“,,—t - < _ 知 ’ 之 = (K,t _ <’奸i) x 
I 1 + � [ ( 1 + 狀部,0-4 + 
J. L 1 . J > 
1 - ( 1 + 5)<_知+2’0 + - - - + a M ( l + 0 < ’ o - 习 if A: is odd = < > � � < 
1 + a (1 + 5) o — 5 + if k is even 
� [ a 2 [l - (1 + 6) + • • • + a^ [1 - (1 + <,o] 
Therefore, the sign of - i is determined by (x；^^ - because 
the latter sum must be non-negative. Since a:* = 1 — (—5广奸i / (1 + <5), we have 
1 - … 1 
1 , r“ if z — t + 1 is even 
T* — < 1 + d 
if 2 - i + 1 is odd 
1 + S 
Hence, 
* * if 2 - i + 1 is even {z - t is odd) 
I - < 5之 ] i f z - t + 1 is odd {z-t is even) 
(4) If number of period in each stage is odd {z is even), then z — t is even when t = 0. 
Therefore, the equilibrium offers goes down in proportional to and then goes up 
in proportional to Subsequent movements follow this manner by going up and then 
going down in proportional to 
(5) The situation for even number of period in each stage (z is odd) because z — t is 
odd when t = 0. Therefore, the equilibrium offers goes up in proportional to 
and then goes down in proportional to Subsequent movements follow this manner 
by going down and then going down in proportional to • 
Property (1) tells us that as long as stage and period are finite, if players are risk 
neutral and the set of agreement is a unit simplex, we must have a unique SPE. This is 
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direct consequence of proposition one as the Pareto frontiers are reducing their sizes over 
time in strictly manner. 
Property (2) shows that for odd period model, as there are fewer and fewer stages left, 
the equilibrium offers must not go up. It is because for odd period model, the enhancing 
effect of first-mover advantage and last-mover advantage of acts on the first proposer. It 
is immediately clear that accepting a proposal would earn an advantageous position in the 
next stage as one could become the first proposer. As players value future surpluses, they 
are willing to make concession strategically when facing an offer because of the advanta-
geous first-mover status in the next stage, the third next stage and so on. When there 
are fewer stages left, the amount of concession is to reduce as the first-mover status is not 
attractive as before. 
Property (3) shows that first mover status is not always welcomed in model with even 
period because enhancing effect of first-mover advantage and damping effect of last-mover 
advantage on the first proposer. In such case, the second mover could have better standing 
if negotiation period is short (small z) or players are patient (small r). Therefore, under 
such situation, even the first mover may be willing to give up part of the interest, compared 
to one-stage bargaining, in order not to be in a disadvantageous position in the next stage. 
The initiative reason for the positive shift when there is even number remaining stages due 
to the balancing effect as both sides have equal number of times being the disadvantaged 
first-mover. 
Property (4) and Property (5) tells us that the equilibrium offers in a stage would 
increase and decrease in alternating and damping manner. The direction for onset of 
swing would depend on the number of period in each stage z�which is completely the same 
as the same in Stahl's model. What is surprising is all magnitudes of the damping of the 
shift have the same proportional constant 
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Strategic concession can cast an insight into models with incomplete information. In 
one-stage model, players without common knowledge of other player's preference might 
try to pretend himself as very patient player because the more patience the player has, 
the more surplus he can obtain in SPE. However, in multi-stage model, in some situation, 
more patient player would get less. Therefore, players will pretend themselves to be an 
impatient player so that other players could not extract his valuation over future surplus. 
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4.2 Stage without deadline G (n, oo) 
For one-stage bargaining G (1, oo), the basic case has been analyzed by Rubinstein in his 
classical paper [ ]. The non-convex feasible case has been analyzed by Binmore and 
Herreo [？] using the concept of security equilibrium, which we have shown in the previous 
subsection. 
Now for multi-stage bargaining G (n, oo)，we wish to solve it using the principle of 
backward induction as final stage can be solved uniquely. Given the result of final stage, 
we solve for the second to the last stage and so on. If every stage could be solved uniquely, 
we should expect there will be a unique SPE for the whole game. Indeed, this result is 
true but needs extra conditions. 
Proposition 3 For bargaining problem G (n, oo), if each bargaining stage itself has a 
unique SPE with immediate agreement and satisfy certain regularity conditions (see the 
proof), the whole game has a unique SPE with immediate agreements and the supporting 
strategy is stage-stationary. 
Proof . To facilitate the discussion, we only deal with two-stage cases. An induction 
argument would complete the proof for finitely many stages cases. Suppose the last stage 
equilibrium is (a, h) if the first proposer is player A and is (c, d) if the first proposer is 
player Br- Since (a, 6) and (c’d) are equilibrium solution, they must be on the Pareto 
frontier. For immediate agreement, we must have Sa^ > c and Ssd > b. Otherwise, player 
would choose to wait. Further suppose the unique strategy is stationary, then we have 
c > 6ao- and b > Ssd. Hence, we must have Sao. = c and dsd^h. Now consider the first 
stage. First, as we have found out the last stage solution, we could simply combine the 
outcome from the second stage to the first stage to form a new game because that second 
In general, first mover should have absolute advantage in infinite period game. Hence, though we have 
not adopted the assumption, we usually assume a > 6 and c < d . 
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stage result is unique. Thus, the new(cumulative) Pareto Frontiers would be: 
"^^工丄 — Oj^  ^ + 
一 + 八a, if Ti = 2kA 
ni^ + (aAS'^^^c, � ) i f ri = {2k + 1) A 
because £i = Ti and the new(cumulative) feasible set W at time ti： 
yyti _ 冲 + ( C M ^ ^ g Z 八 a ， � ) i f Ti = 2kA 
+ [aAS'X'^c, if J\ = {2k + 1) A 
Now, the two-stage bargaining problem becomes a one-stage bargaining problem. Hence, 
we now could solve the two-stage bargaining problem using the concept of security equilib-
rium. For the new game, if we want uniqueness, we need the set E to be singleton. This is 
equivalent to require that (A) the set Eo,t is shrinking as t increases, that is Eq , ! Q 五0，<2 
for ti > t2 and (B) to be singleton as t ^ oo. 
Intuitively, from geometric point of view, as the shape does not change, elimination 
procedure should return a unique point for the set E in the combined bargaining problem. 
Since the new frontiers are formed by transpose of original frontier, it is clear that the 
shape of the curve should be the same. From the pattern of the shift, we know that that 
the frontiers of i = 2 (A; + 1) A move relatively upwards and frontiers oi t = 2kA move 
relatively rightwards. As the shape does not change, elimination procedure should return 
a unique point for the set E in the combined bargaining problem. We would shows the 
step to arrive the solution formally. 
(A): First, let ^^ ^ = sup；^  be the maximum utility obtained by player A at time ti, 
be the maximum utility obtained by player B at time ti, Ot, = infx n i^ be 
the minimum utility obtained by player A at time ti and fiti — infy be the minimum 
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utility obtained by player B at time ti. By the assumption of underlying conflict of interest 
between players, (iti^Pti) and (没AtJ should lie on the 
“ • i n f y 务 f ( … � W - r O 半 + 1)A 
and 
[ ( O t , + aAd'i^^c, Xt, + asS^^^d}) if h = 2kA 
For immediate agreement, we need to have 
infy Q p < infy Q^' and supy. f i f ' < supy fif^ where Ti = (2k + 1) A, Tl = Ti - A 
and 
infx < infx Hp and sup^ < sup；^^ f2�i' where Ti = 2kA, T{ = Ti - A. 
Hence, we need to have, when t'l = ti — A and ti = (2A; + 1) A, 
Pt'i + a e S f b < Pt^  + aeS^^^d and A^ , + asS^^'^d < A^； + ocb 疗” 
and when £i = t^  - A and ti = 2kA 
et[ + ocAS'y^a < 9t, + � a n d & + < � � + 
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It can be easily shown that the above inequalities hold when 
Po (^B + (SBd - b) > 0 ’ 
A o ( l - 5 B ) + a A { b - 5 B d ) > 0, 
{Sa - 1) + a s {Sac - a) > 0， 
ao (1 - + a s (a - Sac) > 0. 
These conditions are easily satisfied when players are patient enough and the unique equi-
librium is stationary. Usually we have 彻=0�= 0 as we set disagreement payoff equal to 
perpetual disagreement payoff which is zero. Since the shape of f ip are the same for every 
value of Ti,there would be no intersection point between Pareto frontiers f2p across time. 
Hence, the size of the set Eo’t is non-increasing as t increases. 
(B):To prove this formally, let us look at the difference between the new Pareto frontiers 
rip and the first-stage Pareto frontiers fiJK Since in the original problem has unique 
equilibrium, it means that the curves must be in the shape such that the set E contains 
only one element. Given {Xi U {di}} remains constant throughout the whole game, from 
the above remark, we also know that £b，oo is also a singleton. For simplicity, let us assume 
common discount factor r^ = tb = r such that 6a = Sb = ^ and maximum surplus for 
each player would be one. Now, if we look at new Pareto frontiers Qp，we could see that 
new Pareto frontier functions are: 
New Frontier Function t is odd t is even 
u = {v) fi^ {v 一 aS^' c) + d fij [v - a) + acJ^^ b 
V = rij (v) Qg (t; - 乃 d) + 乃 c {v - a5了! b) + 乃 a 
When t is odd, we would have 
supxEo,t = ( … ( n p (acJ'd)))) = r (S'd) 
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and 
infx Eo,t = ( … ( 1 + d ) ) ) ) ) = r (1 + ad)) 
where T (•) = f i � ( … ( � & 2 ^^t-i (•)))) -g ^ function of t. Assume that T (•) is twice 
continuous differentiable, we can approximate the difference using second order of Taylor 
series expansion directly: 
r{6*{l + ad))-r{5^ad) 
= r ' (1 + ad) AtS''' + r � (，句 [ ( 1 + ad) Atf 5^' + ... 
= 0 when t —> oo 
because r ' ad) , T" ad) , . . . should remains finite as slope of frontier cannot be infinite. 
Now, consider when t is even, 
supx Eo,t = ( … n p ( O f ^ ( • ) ) ) ) = A 
and 
supx Eo,t = ( … { n ^ {nf" (l + a a ) ) ) ) ) = A (1 + aa)). 
Using Taylor series expansion, we find that 
= A ' ((5'aa) (1 + d) + 八“(二 [(i + d) Atf S^^ + ... 
= 0 when t — oo 
because A' [S^aa)，A� (S*aa) , . . .should remains finite as slope of frontier cannot be infinite. 
Now, we have shown that the even t set of Eo’t and odd set of Eo’t converge to a point 
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what remains to be shown is that two points coincide in the limit. 
A � a a ) = r {6^ad) as t -> oo. 
Suppose there is symmetry between two players, then we must have a = d , b = c and 
A = r for all t:''^ ' Then it would be true that snpx Eo’t = inf^ as i — oo and 
supy Eo’t = infy Eo,t as t —> oo can be shown using similar logic. 
Prom the construction of the strategy, it is clear that strategy would be same for each 
stage because the environment has not changed across period so that the strategy is stage-
period stationary. • 
Different from the finite-stage, finite-period model, last-mover advantage does not exist 
in infinite period model because there is no last mover aa there is no last stage for the 
ultimatum. Therefore, only first-mover advantage exists under all circumstances. Similar 
to result from the finite counterpart, the effect due to first-mover advantage would be 
greater in the first few stages and this advantage would be reduced as there are less number 
of stages in the future. The intuition of course is similar to the finite case: the more future 
cooperation opportunities are, the more the both players are willing to sacrifice the present 
surplus in order not to delay the future total surplus. 
Going back to the standard Rubinstein bargaining problem could allow us to observe 
this fact easily. When we looking at the pattern of equilibrium offer, one could observe 
the equilibrium offers are decreasing as the game proceeds. See appendix II for the proof 
using Shaked and Sutton's technique. One can easily show that the result of the finite 
period model is equal to the limiting case of infinite period model. Figure ! shows how the 
equilibrium offers change as number of remaining stages for finitely repeated Rubinstein 
Note that it is only sufficient conditions. In reality, the necessary condition required is that the two 
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Figure 1: Stage-stationary equilibrium offer as a function of the number of remaining stage 
bargaining game. Note that since the strategy are stage-stationary, the strategy for each 
player in each stage is the same. 
The reason for the decreasing offers is that the first proposer could extract lesser surplus 
as cost due to delay is dropping. Hence, the enhancing effect of first-mover advantage drops 
when there is fewer number of stage remaining. Before ending this section, we would like 
to make some comments on the conclusion by Muthoo's conclusion [ ] : 
..Rubinstein's unique equilibrium is not robust to "small external ef-
fects" ,in that the indeterminacy of the basic bargaining problem is re-obtained 
if the players expect to bargain, with an arbitrarily small probability, over the 
partition of another cake each time they reach agreement over the partition of 
an existing cake." 
From the result obtained in the section, we might append the following statement: 
“However, when there is a limit over maximum number of cakes can be divided or both 
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players know in advance they have a finite number of cakes to divide, the uniqueness is 
re-obtained.“ 
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5 Infinite Stage Models 
We have shown that the requirements for uniqueness of perfect equilibrium in finite stage 
models are not difficult to meet. However, for infinite stage game, the set of SPE is 
not necessarily unique even if the Pareto frontier is continuous. The underlying reason 
is that the infinite interaction would expand the set of perfect equilibrium outcome as a 
consequence of folk theorem result in infinite repeated game. 
5.1 Stage with deadline G (oo, z) 
The result is almost the same as the infinite stage, infinite period model G (oo, oo), so we 
will discuss the two models together in the next subsection. 
5.2 Stage without deadline G (oo, oo) 
We will establish two results in this subsection: (i) refine the set of SPE by removing 
extremal outcomes using global stability criteria and (ii) support outcomes in convexified 
set which may be outside the feasible set. 
Prom repeated game literature, using folk theorem, we could establish that any payoff 
which is strictly greater than the minimax payoff to be a perfect equilibrium for any infi-
nitely repeated game as long as players are patient enough. In infinite-stage, infinite-period 
models G (oo, oo) (and also G (oo, z) ？“），following the same principle, one could show that 
any result strictly greater than the disagreement payoff could be supported as SPE. More-
over, due to the structure of a bargaining game, outcomes with payoff equal to minimax 
level could also be supported.However, it means that extremal outcome such as one 
player always grab the whole surplus can be supported, which is rather counter-intuitive.'' 
31 Since the proof is very similar, we would omit it in exposition. 
32Muthoo [ ] has proved this result for infinitely repeated Rubinstein bargaining game. 
33 The reason is that if one player is being exploited or bullied by another player, he should not cooperate 
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As the set of SPE is so huge that almost all possible outcomes could be supported, we need 
another stricter and natural criteria to remove those outcomes. Since infinitely repeated 
game usually involves infinitely many strategies with long-period histories and complicated 
punishment scheme, selection of SPE would be more natural and practical for implementa-
tion if we have simple strategies, simple punishment scheme, limited dependence on history 
and robustness of equilibrium payoff against deviation. The first three requirements could 
be satisfied if we adopt the penal code for punishment mechanism [ ]. The notion of global 
stability by Kandori [ ] could serve the purpose of removing outcomes which would lead to 
off-equilibrium payoff forever.'^ '' Using penal code and global stability, we could eliminate 
those extremal outcomes. The intuition is that one could not find suitable punishment be-
cause the outcome is already worst for one player: "How can one possibly use punishment 
to punish a player obtaining the lowest possible payoff?" 
Proposition 4 For bargaining problem G (oo, oo) with {Xk U {dk}}k=i ，if 让 satisfies the 
assumption of underlying conflict of interest, every outcome could be supported as SPE if 
players are patient enough or time lags between offers and time lags between stages are 
short enough:��If we refine the set of equilibrium using global stability, extremal outcome 
that one player always obtains his maximum possible surplus and another player always 
his minimal possible surplus in all stages could be excluded. 
Proof. To prove the proposition, we first need to establish that every possible outcome 
can be supported as perfect equilibrium using penal code and then exclude the extremal 
outcome using stability criteria. Now, with the assumption of underlying conflict of inter-
est, let life and u^ player highest share of surplus and lowest share of surplus obtained in 
with him or should seek another to share the surplus. 
' Roughly speaking, global stability means that off-equilibrium path can not last forever in the sense 
that no matter under what kind of history, players must eventually receive the equilibrium payoff. 
35Muthoo [ ] only proves this fact in standard Rubinstein game but not general setting. 
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kth stage respectively. Similarly, Vfc and Vk player B's highest share of surplus and lowest 
share of surplus obtained in kth. stage respectively. Under the assumption as underlying 
conflict of interest, when player A is having lifc, player B is having Vk and when player 
A is having u^, player B is having v/；. To support outcome with immediate agreements 
〈(工i’2/i) ’Ti, (0；2，2/2) ,了2，•"�where Tk — {k - 1) r, it simply requires that in kth stage, 
player A only accepts offers not less than Xk and rejects any other offers, and player B 
only accepts offers not less than y^ and rejects any other offers. Punishment scheme would 
start immediately if any player accept any offers less than the prescribed amount. 
We would like to use penal code [ ] to formulate the punishment scheme. If any player 
deviates, he would receive penalty designed for him. If the deviant fails to conform the 
penal code, the punishment would restart from the beginning of the penal code. If any 
player fails to punish the deviants, that player would be punished by the penalty designed 
for him. Note that when both players deviates at the same time, there is no punishment 
needed. Roughly speaking, our penalty is that the deviant would receive lowest possible 
payoff and the punisher would receive highest payoff so that no player has incentive to 
deviate and player do have incentive to conform to punishment. Formally, the penal code 
for player A is that player B offers u^ and retains v^ and player A has to conform this 
division scheme from now and on. Similarly, the penal code for player B is that player A 
always offers yfc and retains Ufc and player B has to conform this division scheme from now 
and on. 
On the equilibrium path, given players equilibrium strategy, it would not be optimal 
for players to offer anything other than the prescribed. When one player deviates to offer 
more, the other player is willing to accept such offers and the game would proceeds as in 
no deviation. When one player deviates to offer less, the other player would reject if the 
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gain is less than the loss from perpetual punishment of lowest possible payoff: 
oo oo 
^^ E U{xh)a\ > U{xk)+ E t/(uja^and 
h=:k /i=fc+l 
h=k h=k+l 
If the conditions are not met, the game would proceeds to the execution of penal code. 
When the game is under the penal code of player A, as player A is receiving the lowest 
possible payoff, it makes no sense for player B to offer more as player A would simply 
accept it. Player A makes an offer less than vjfc, player B would reject when the one-shot 
gain is less than the long-run loss if 
oo CX3 
h=k h=k+l 
Of course, as player A is getting the minimal and player B is getting the maximal, player 
A cannot offer more and player B cannot offer less. The deduction for game under penal 
code of player B goes similarly. The sufficient condition required for no deviation would 
be 
h=k h=k+l 
If Xk = X, yk — y, Vfc =v and Ufc =u for all k, then sufficient conditions would become 
{SA + a A - l ) U { x ) - a A U (ufc+i) > 0’ 
+ > 0， 
+ > 0， 
{6A + a A - l ) U { u ) - a A U {n^+i) > 0. 
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Usually, we would have V (v^) = 0 and U (uj^ .) = 0 for all fc, then we would return to the 
sufficient condition specified by Muthoo: 
<^>1 + tt/l > 1 and SB + OiB > 1. 
If we want to support outcomes without immediate agreement，:化 we only need to make 
players offering lowest possible share to the other player and only accepts highest possible 
share from other player before the prescribed time and return the prescribed division 
scheme after the prescribe time. On the equilibrium path, if anyone deviates at time T^ . 
(or at t'l^  if the time is counted from beginning of the stage) and accepts, he would be 
punished forever and so the conditions required are: 
> + £ and 
h=k h=k+l 
h=k h=k+l 
Again, when tk = tA, Xk = x, yk = y, vjfc =v, Ufc =u, V {vk) = 0 and U (u .^) = 0 for all k, 
we have 
- ( l - a ) C / ( u ) > 0 and 
… - ( 1 - … " 々 ） > 0 
which are similar to above conditions but more difficult to satisfied. Both set of inequalities 
would be same only if equalities holds for U [x) <U (li) and V {y) <V (v). 
We have proved the first part of the statement that every outcome could be supported 
and now we have to adopt the globally stable criteria. Since the stability requires payoff 
•'"That is, outcome ((xi.yi) ,Ti, (0:2,2/2) ,T2,...) with Tjt • ( / : - 1 ) t . 
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returns to equilibrium payoff eventually, therefore punishment cannot last forever and must 
end within finite number stages. Let p be the number of stage of punishment. Using the 
same logic, we could find out that the inequalities to be satisfied are: 
oo , fc+P oo , 
E U{xh)a\ > U{xk)+ E U{nh)(A+ E U{xh)a\ and 
h=k h—k+1 h=k+p+l 
oo , k+p oo , 
Sb E V{yh)a% > V{yk)+ E E 
h=k h=k+l h=k+p+l 
And when it is on off-equilibrium path, for the deviation made at time t'^ A^ < p, counted 
from the starting of penal code), the conditions are 
t'^  p + i t'fc'+i t'^+P+i 
P oo *fc+P oo 
t'^  p+i t'^ +i q+p+i 
Now, let us simplify the inequalities by, Xk = x, yk = y, v/, =v, lijfc =u, V (y^) = 0 and 
U (Ufc) = 0 for all k, we have 
SA + OIA- OFA ^ 1’ 
+ ttfi - > 1, 
ocaSA (1 - aP) X - U (1 - aA) (1 - SA) > 0’ 
o:bSb ( l - Q^b) y - V (1 - a s ) (1 - 6b) > 0. 
Clearly if x = 0 or y = 0, the last two equation can never be satisfied no matter how 
large a and <5 are. • 
Intuitively speaking, extremal outcome is not possible because there does not exist any-
kind of punishment with deterrent effect for the player who is accepting lowest possible 
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share. Then that player would always defect if he is given an offer with non-zero payoff. 
Therefore, using the concept of global stability, we have shown that extremal outcomes 
are removed from the set of perfect equilibrium. Note that the first two inequalities tell us 
that if we are to use limited stage punishment scheme, the patience and/or the time lag 
requirement are/is more stringent. 
Surprisingly, such kind of elimination of the extremal outcome is makes the infinitely 
repeated bargaining game behaves like to standard infinitely repeated normal form game 
that under folk theorem, perfect equilibrium payoff vector has no component equal to 
the component of minimax payoff vector. Another interesting result is that the last two 
equations show that limited punishment also links the size of the set of equilibrium to 
equilibrium partition level, in addition to our usual requirements of patience and time lag. 
Moreover, when the number of punishment stage goes to infinity, the condition converges 
to the Muthoo's requirement a + 5 > 1. 
Now, we are going to show the second important result that if the bargaining set is non-
convex, outcome outside the feasible set could be support non-stationary SPE outcome. 
Actually, this is the corollary of the previous proposition. 
Corollary 5 For bargaining problem G (oo, n) or G (oo, oo), if the cumulative feasible sets 
ut^ = (ELi w J N E L i ^ ? ) —ere e U^" are non-convex, then any outcome 
in the convexified set can be achieved as close as possible if players are patient enough or 
time lag between offers and stage are short enough. 
Proof. From the proposition that every outcome could be supported as perfect equilibrium 
if players are patient enough or time lag between offers and stage are short enough. For 
outcome with payoff (w, v) where u = ta+{l -t)c and v — tb+ {1 — t) d, 0 < t < l’(a, b) G 
li^k and (c, d) G U^'' to be supported by playing (a, 6) for na’b times and then play (c, d) 
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for nc’d times, we need to have 
i = 1 - 4 二 l - ^ B 
where na,b = h/ {Ji + k) and nc,d = fc/ {h + k). Since na’b and nc，d are required to be 
integers but h and k are real numbers between zero and one, we could achieve the particular 
outcome exactly only when h and k are rational number, though we could approach as 
close as possible if h or fc is real number^''. _ 
Besides the refinement by stability applied above, one common criterion is efficiency 
consideration. For repeated bargaining problems, efficiency could be viewed at least from 
two aspects: static efficiency and dynamic efficiency"'". Static efficient solution is that one 
cannot improve payoff of one stage game of one player without harming the other player. 
Clearly, under the assumption of underlying conflict of interest, any agreement on Pareto 
frontier are static efficient. On the other hand, dynamic efficient solution is that one cannot 
increase the sum of discounted payoffs of the whole game of one player without harming 
the other player. In the other words, static efficiency is Pareto efficiency within a stage 
while dynamic efficiency is Pareto efficiency for the whole game..力 Hence, one dynamic 
concept does not imply the other. 
In one-stage bargaining, in almost all cases, static efficiency could be assumed to be 
true.'") In multi-stage bargaining problem, many static efficient solutions are not dynamic 
" I t is because for any two unequal rational number, there is a real number in between. 
38 Dynamic efficiency has been mentioned by [ ] on infinitely repeated game. 
^"Formally speaking, an agreement { { x a , Xs ) ,Tk) is static efficient if there is no other agree-
ment in X [0,oo] such that {{x'X,x%),Tn) —i ,Tfc) for i = 
A,B. A sequence of agreements (�(iji’^ }?)，7\〉，…，〈(：^’；^’ 王‘占)，r„〉) is dynamic efficient if there is no 
other sequence of agreements a;)}) , ,Tn)) in U {dk}} x [O’ool}==i such that 
' "The reason is that it is never optimal for proposer to make a Pareto dominated offer. For a rational 
player, he has no reason not to increase his share without reducing other player's share. Suppose the player 
i wants to make an offer { x a , x b ) where there is another offer { x a , x b ) such that { x a , x b ) ^ a { x a , x b ) 
and (xa ,xh) (xAiXs)- There is no reason not to purpose {xa,xb) as the share is increased without 
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inefficient. Particularly, for non-convex set, outcomes outside the feasible set are more 
dynamic efficient than all solutions lie on Pareto frontier. We all know that efficiency does 
not directly imply absence of implementation problems in practice. From the corollary, 
it is obvious that at least two different offers are needed in order to reach outcome in 
convexified set. Then implementation of such equilibrium might require a lot of information 
and calculation, which in practice is usually not worth to do so. In light of this, one might 
decide to use lottery to decide the first mover each time instead of our system, the lottery 
probability is set in the way such that the expected payoff would be the required payoff. No 
doubt, it is much easier to implement but such kind of lottery would have other problem 
that it is not ex-post optimal for the player losing the lottery. 
increase the risk of being rejected. However, there is sometimes that static efficiency does not hold. For 
example, suppose player i wants to make an offer { x a , x b ) where there is another offer { x a , x b ) such that 
{xA,xii) ^A { x a , x b ) and { x a , x b ) —b { x a , x b ) - If {{xA,XB),t) —b {{xa,xb) ,t + 1) is true, then player 
B would not reject it. In this case, there is no reason why player A would try to make player B better 
unless player A care fore what player B obtains from the agreement. 
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6 Non-convex Example 
In previous two sections, we have discussed bargaining games in general framework. As we 
have extended traditional bargaining models by adoption of repeated interaction and non-
convex feasible set. This section is devoted to the discussion of two special non-convex cases: 
players with risk-loving attitude and players exhibiting indomitable behavior, which are 
two common behavioral preferences. We will cover the application of repeated interaction 
in practical modeling in next section. 
6.1 Risk loving players 
Suppose the players have risk loving attitude which is modeled by U (x) = and V (y)= 
yb where k > 1. For simplicity, we assume a = b = k and ta = tb = r. Hence (w)= 
u”k and {v) = •丨k. The feasible set would then be 
Xt = e R^ : + S 5尤’ 1； 2 0’w 2 O}. 
and the Pareto frontier function is 
u = = - v^/'^y and v = = ((J* - w " ” 知. 
The following graph below shows the feasible set Xq of the model. 
Proposition 6 In one-stage bargaining game G (1，oo) with set of agreements Xk = {(a^ y): 
x + y <l] and risking loving agent U (a:) = a;" and V {y) = the unique SPE outcome 
is that player A always offers (x, 1 — re) and player B always offers (1 — y，y). 








( 0 , 0 ) 丨 ^ 
Figure 2: Feasible set for risk loving players 
Proof. The unique SPE is in fact the same as the general case (va — re and k^ ^ ks) 
derived using Shaked and Sutton techniques (see in appendix). Here we would try to prove 
the common discount case and common preference using the concept of security equilibrium. 
Using the procedure of deletion of iterated conditional dominance, we have, when t is 
odd k 
supx Bo,t (0)))) = [l- S”叙 + 例 k —…+ 於 — 0]“ 
(略 2 (n^-i � ) ) ） = [ 1 - 斤 + , — … + , 爹 -
supy 丑0，纟 [^'a^ (沪 )））） = -炉丨 k -…—於+ 
miYEo,t n^ei-^A^ i^B^ { ^ a ' (。)))）= - 剩 乂 -…-<5(尤-1)/知 + o] 
and when t is even u 
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supx Eo’t n^Ai-^B^ (收 2 {Qt-l (炉)))）=卜-各 1/k + 0 k —…—於-l)/fc + 炉/fcj ‘ — 
infx Eo,t n V - f ^ B ^ (0)))) = [ l - + 52/fc — … — 於 — + ol 
Proof. J ：^—— 
supy^o,t (Q^-i ( 0 ) ) ) ) = [Ji/fc — ^2/fc — … _ 於-2)/fc + 於-i)/fc _ oj 
infy 〜 Q U - ^ b ' (炉)）））=[在 IZ 於 - 炉 丨 k - … - 龙 + 尤-1)/知-
Hence, we have 
t supx Eo，t infx Eo,t supy Eo,t infy Eo’t 
~ ~ ~ [ 1 + 叫 ' [ 1 + 叫 " [ 1 ] ( " / 〒 -
。 I r r ^ l ~1 + I llTTT I^ I 1 + I 
f l + ^ W f e f � 1 - 5 " 叫 + � 1 - 5 叫 
even -y；- ttz 5 rr,~ 5 ttz 
1 + 1 + 5”k 1 + l + 於 — 
It can be easily observed that sup；^  Eo’t and supy Eo，t is monotonic decreasing and 
bounded. Moreover, infx 丑o’t and infy Eo^ t is monotonic increasing and bounded. Hence, 
the set Eo’t collapse as t increases. As t goes to infinity, we could see that 
t supx Eo^t infx Eo^t supy Eo^t infy Eo^t 
H ( T T ^ ) 1 ( 1 7 ^ )卜 ( T t W ) K i t W ) 
Hence, we have a unique equilibrium because 
SPE = n Eo’t = n ( { K y) •• infx 五o’t < a： < sup^ Eo,t, infy Eo’t <y< supy Eo,t} n J^o) 
f=0 f 二0 
= ( { ( a ^ y) • i n f x 五0，oo < < sup；；^ 五o’oo， infy £'0,00 < y < s u p y Eq^oc}门叉0) 
= / ( f 1 V ( 斤 V^l 
=H^VTTT^j J j . 
• 
The first intuitive comparison of risk-neutral and risk-loving bargainers would be same, 
except the discount rate changed from 5 to 5”k, This would imply that if we are to 
model risk-loving by exponential function only, then risk-loving bargainers would simply 
have larger patience than a risk-neutral bargainers. It means that the more the risk-
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loving the bargainer is, the larger the share of surplus. This idea fit our intuition that as 
risk-lovers are less risk averse to perpetual disagreement which realizes partially as delay 
in conclusion of negotiation their opponents need to pay more to buy their agreements. 
Luckily, the outcome of perfect equilibrium remains unique so that one could still avoid 
the usual problems in non-convex feasible set. 
6.2 Indomitable players 
Even from daily-life observation, it is not difficult to note that there are numerous dirty 
tactics behind power struggles.'" It is because winner gets almost all but loser gets almost 
nothing. Even if the competition result is not so clear-cut, the status of being a winner 
does have special meaning and may be more important than the prize itself. Sometimes, 
the loser simply wishes the prize to be destroyed rather than be held by the opponent. 
This means that feeling of winner would have value to players. 
Another motivation to study indomitability is that psychological and behavioral effect 
derived from bargaining outcome. Very often, people would not only just view the outcome 
negotiation solely based on the absolute amount of benefit but rather, they may have a 
psychological reservation amount. Usually, the amount reflects the bargainers perception 
of fair share of bargaining. Players would be dissatisfied if they get less than the fair share 
of the surplus. 
Therefore, it would be natural to define the threshold value of surplus to be one-half 
as the criterion of winner. We would expect the marginal utility should increase after the 
threshold value as players is enjoying a greater sense of winner and become more satisfied 
with the result. 
Without loss of generality, for simplicity, we would assume common discount factor 
. "One famous quotation related to this view is "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 
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rA = rB = r. Mathematically, the utility function for player A is: 
f x if z < /i 
and the utility function for player B is: 
f 
^ ^ I Iv ify 
where m < h and n < k to reflect non-convexity. The following shows how the utility 
changes with the share of surplus: 
u V 
(0,1) (0.1) 
# / f 
4 4 
Z _ _ u . 
(0,0) (1,0) (o’o) (1,0) 
Utility function of player A Utility function of player B 
To obtain the bilinear Pareto frontier, one must set h = 1—A; and h = k. Hence, we must 
have h = k = l/2.The cutoff point h = k = 1/2 could have a good economic implication. 
Usually speaking, we consider the fair share value to be one-half of the surplus. There 53 
are at least five reasons behind this assumption. Firstly, in many customs and cultures, 
we know that fair value is somewhere around one-half. Secondly, in power struggle and 
in the event of impasse, usually the tie-breaking rule is voting, which is determined by-
rule of majority. Hence, one-half is the critical point. Thirdly, it is mathematical simple 
to derive Pareto frontier function. If the kink on the utility function is bilinear at one 
half, the Pareto frontier is bilinear; otherwise, it is multilinear. Fourthly, if we agreed that 
the most basic non-convex bargaining is the exponential decaying Pareto frontier which is 
difFerentiable, the second basic one is bilinear Pareto frontier on is differentiable almost 
everywhere except the kinked point. Fifthly, this kind of characterization partly catches 
the concept of relative gain. Therefore the utility functions would change to 
‘ 
u! = 2mxS* 
i f x < l / 2 , y > l / 2 
v^ = [2(1 - m)y - (1 - 2m)] S^ 
and 
f 
= [2 (1 - m) X - (1 - 2m)] 
< L 乂 � J if a: > 1/2, 2/< 1/2. 
V* = 2my6^ 
< 
The Pareto frontier functions are 
+ 1 if w < m 
V = CIq = 
1 一 m l—m — 
and 
oO / � … i f … 
u = iV^ = 
1—n I 1—n 一 
\ 
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Figure 3: Graph of model with a single-kinked Pareto frontier 
Figure 3 shows the feasible set at time O.Note that the point (m, n) is the kink of the 
frontier. Under assumption of symmetry condition(m = n) and common discount factor, 
the function of Pareto frontier are 
t ot ( t^ I 以尤+ " 三 V = Uq (u j = 
[ + T^S* 三 h^B (以” if > 炉rn 
and 
, o t 1 以k + y 三� $ 1 ( 0 ifw^ScJ^m 
w = = 
which are piece-wise functions. It is not immediately clear that when to use which 
part. To simplify the complication, suppose m < 6/ (1 + <5). This assumption is not too 
restrictive as players would have high value of 6 if they are patient enough or the time lag 
between offers is short enough. 
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Proposition 7 In one-stage bargaining game with set of agreements Xk = {(x, y) ： x + y < 1} 
and indomitable agent, that is, having the following forms of utility: 
u* = 2mx6^ 
if x< 1/2,y> 1/2 
t/ = [2(1 - m)y - (1 - 2m)] S^ 
and 
ifxA > 1/2, y < 1/2-
v^ = 2my6* 
The set SPE outcome is 
f , . m 1 1 m 6 
Proof. We are going to apply the iterated deletion of conditional dominated strategies to 
solve the SPE. In algebra, we have for when t is odd (see appendix for derivation) 
t odd t 
s u p x Eo,t fe-2 ( 0 ) ) ) ) ) = ^ 
infx ^0, (/^-i fe-i � ) ) )） = 1 P - 炉 
infy Et’o "广+1 fe-2 (。)))）=广二 J ( 1 � / P ) — 
and when t is even, we have the following (see appendix for derivation) 
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t e v e n t 
s u p x Eo’t I'r iA-'K-' ⑷)))）二 ^ ^ 一 
h t , ( . . / � ‘ ( e f e - i ( 0 ) ) ) ) ) = 1 二 
supy Et’o Zr+i ( " f ("B-i (0)))) = ^  ^ YJP ^ 
infy Et’o " r + i (Z� -2 ( /4 -1 � ） ) ） = 1 f " 爪 d ( 二 f ) 
Graphically, the solving is done according the following diagram. 
V V 
(0,1) ^ (0.1) 7 
W ‘ , ， \ \ 〜 / , 
(0.0) (1.0) (0,0) (1.0) 
When t is odd When t is even 
Hence, combining the both cases, we have 
t snpx i n f x - E o . t s u p y Eo^t i n f y Eo,t 
m 1+6' t S (1 - 6'-') (1 - m) m 6 (1 - S''') 
__1 TTT i-mi + r 1 + + …�m T^ m 1 + ^ , -
1 + m + m 6 (1 - 6'} 
even n 丄 + ^ 1 - m 1 + S ~ 1 + 5 ^-m 1 
It can be easily observed that sup乂 Eo,t and supy Eo,t is monotonic decreasing and 
bounded. Moreover, infx Eo,t and infy Eo’t is monotonic increasing and bounded. Hence, 
the set Eo’t collapse as t increases. As t goes to infinity, we could see that 
t supx Eo^t infx Eo^t supy Eo,t infy Eo^t 
1 m 1 5 m 5 
QQ 
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Figure 4: Set of SPE for single-kinked Pareto frontier 
Prom [ ]，we know the set of SPE is indeed 
SPE = n Eo’t = n ({(工,2/) : < x < sup；^ ^o.t, infy ^o.t <y< s i ^ £；0’力}门 Xo) 
t=0 t = 0 
= ( { ( a : , y ) : i n f x •E'o.oo <x< snpx 丑0’oo, i n f y 丑o’oo <y < s u p y £ ^ 0 , 0 0 }门 X o ) 
f i, � m 1 ^ ^ 1 m S ^ ^ ^ \ 
which is shown graphically below • 
One could easily observe the set is not symmetric. It is due to the fact that the two 
bargainers are not in the same position as the player A is the first mover with right to 
make the first proposal. One interesting fact of this set of solution would be the fact that 
the set would not approach to be a symmetric set even when we take the discount factor 5 
as approach to one. This is rather unusual result as in all convex case, the asymmetry due 
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to the bargaining structure would be eliminated as players become very patient or the time 
lag become very small. The reason of such behavior might be due to the special bilinear 
structure of the utility function. 
Binmore has used non-stationary strategy to support such a large set of equilibrium 
outcome. Sometimes it would be much more realistic to expect bargainers using sta-
tionary strategies. Therefore, before conclusion of this section, we would like to single 
out four stationary strategies supporting SPE and try to compare them with the standard 
Rubinstein game. It turns out that there are out of the four stationary strategies, two are 
symmetric and the other two are asymmetric. 
Proposition 8 In one-stage bargaining game with indomitable agent, where utility func-
tions and set of agreements are stated as in previous proposition, there are four stationary 
strategies (x, y) which can be supported as subgame perfect outcome. The four SPE strate-
gies are 
_ 1 _ 1 + (1 - 2m) + 
" 2(1 + 5) ( 1 - m ) 吻 = 2 ( l + 5 ) ( l - m ) ’ 
二 2 ( 1 + (5) ( 1 - 1 )抓 " ^奴二 2(1 + (5)(1 — m)’ 
— _ 2m —- 2mS + S 
二 双= 2 [ m + 5( l—m)] ’ 
4)工=y = 2 [m5 + (1 — m)] 
where player i is to accept any offer having more payoff than x and to offer y independent 
of history. 
Proof. Suppose that player A always offers x and player B always offer y such that the 
payoff for player A being the proposer, and the payoff of player B being the proposer would 
.12 For the characterization of the strategy supporting the SPE, please refer to [ ] for further details. 
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always be and if they has reached agreement in time t. Using the stationarity 
property, we could derive the following results: 
(1) If we have u < m and v > m, we would have 
l — m m m 
u + 1 = 01； and u H = dv 
m l—m l—m 
which becomes 
m 1 1 
u — and V = -. 
1 + 1 + 5 
Hence we would have 
_ 1 _ ! + ( ! - 2m) + 5 
工 = 2 ( l + ( J ) ( l - m ) ^ = 2 ( l + 5 ) ( l - m ) 
(2) And the analysis for u > m and v < m would also result in same result with (1) 
but with different subscript. 
(3) Supposing u > m and v >m, 
m m . , m m 
u H = ov and — v + = ou 
l—m l — m 1 - m l — m 
which we would have 
m 2m — 2mS + 5 
u = v = —pr- r and x = y = "—tj-^ m + 5 (1 - m) 2[m + d{l - m)] 
(4) Finally, if u\ < m and Uq < m, we have 
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UA=UB = ~； r where XA=XO = — ^ ^ ^ mS + (1 - m) ^ b 2[mS+ {1-m)] 
with only restriction m < S. • 
Intuitively, the reason for existence of four stationary equilibriums is very simple. It 
is because each players' utility function is bilinear such that there are four possible of 
combination of applicable sections of two players. When both are greater or less than the 
threshold one-half, the stationary equilibrium strategy is symmetric. When one is greater 
than the threshold but the other is not, the equilibrium strategy is asymmetric. 
For symmetric equilibrium, if players are so patient or the time lag between offers are 
minimized that J — 1，then x = y — 1/2 since there should be no first-mover advantage. 
If we take m —> 1/2 which indeed is the standard Rubinstein game, then we have :c 二 y 二 
1/ (1 + J) which return us the standard bargaining solution. If we collapse the kink point 
m —> 0, then x = y = 1/2. This case is very closed situation of problem of two competitive 
firms facing a very small market in which mutual entries would have little payoff while 
monopolization returns a huge profit because the fixed cost is huge. Traditional method 
to resolve this problem is by collusion or by joint venture. However, it is very likely that 
the antitrust department would forbid this kind of agreement. In this case, if two firms 
could have the chance to enter such situation for more than one time, the two firms could 
use could resolve the inefficiency under repeated bargaining. Inter-temporal coordination 
can be used to ensure a better outcome. In there are many markets two firms might share, 
they might take turns to share the market. This might be one of the reasons why some 
cartels appears in the form of locational monopolization in which one firm is assigned to 
be sole seller in that market. 
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For asymmetric equilibrium, different from the previous symmetric cases, even if d — 1， 
we still have x = y < 1/2 which means the asymmetric retains even if discount rate 
converge to one. This is a very interesting situation because in all convex bargaining, it 
is impossible to obtain non-symmetric outcome when players become very patient. If the 
game has status quo with such asymmetric conditions, the game would continue to play 
as usual as it is not profitable for any player to deviate from the previous condition alone. 
This might be applied to explain why the bargaining would not usually ends in one-half 
although it seems it should be the focal point and discount rate is usually converge to one 
given the small time lag between offers and counteroffers. One could resume the symmetric 
property only when m —> 1/2. By this, we could establish a new view that inequality and 
conflict might arise due to increasing return to scale or high fixed cost and status quo. 
Hence, status quo would affect the bargaining outcome which is not possible in convex 
cases. Different from traditional model, apart from patience, the bargaining power might 
come from status quo. This might be important in empirical application and our intuition 
because the classical model simply cannot have the status quo affect the outcome. Another 
important implication of this result is that in the traditional agenda model, in order to 
obtain the result that agenda matters, the assumption that utility derived form negotiation 
only realized when all consensus on all issues reached is needed. The restriction is needed 
to ensure the outcome from previous issues would affect the next issues. However, it is 
very rare that consensus can be reached on most issue in most political negotiation. With 
non-convex model, we would eliminate the need to have such restriction since the game by 
itself is outcome-dependent. In daily life example, more often than not, household work has 
high fixed cost and each task is usually performed by one person (in the past, it is usually 
mother who assumes this role) due to efficiency reasoning. When the assigned requests the 
other members of the family to share the burden, it is very difficult to convince other to 
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join the project. This is due to the poor initial status of the assigned. 
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7 Application 
(1) Crisis Bargaining in Hostage Negotiation and Peace Negotiation 
In this thesis, we spend a great deal of pages on bargaining stage with predetermined 
deadline. The literature seems not interested in this kind of modeling. However, in reality, 
bargaining with deadline indeed is more common than the infinite bargaining. In particular, 
bargaining with deadline could model the situation that players are eager to solve the 
problem and would been seriously unhappy if the negotiation continues after certain period 
of time. For example, in hostage negotiation, both the police and the gang are eager to 
solve the problem immediately. If the police could not resolve the issue quick enough, 
then she would be blamed as usefulness and inefficient. If the gang cannot obtain what 
they have intended quickly, their supplies such as water and food would be inadequate to 
sustain for long time and the gang would be under huge pressure as police special force 
might try to resolve the issue through force. Another situation with predefined deadline is 
political peace talk. The six-party talks between US, Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, 
North Korea, which aims to find a peaceful solution to security concerns as a result of 
North Korea nuclear weapons program, has very clear predefined deadline for each round 
and each phase. 
An important application is to model war as repeated bargaining. The fundamental 
problem in those models is that while they recognize war is always costly and inefficient, 
they cannot fully justify why wars indeed break out when side-payment is often available. 
However, one might easily understand why territorial disputes often ended in war. It is 
not only because of indivisibility of land but also due to the fact that the weak side has to 
resort to brutal force to change the status quo as in bargaining with indomitable players. 
(2) Controlling right in companies and coalition government 
We have modeled the non-convex feasible bargaining example: single-kinked utility and 
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Pareto Frontier. This underlying assumption is the marginal return would have sudden 
rise after certain critical share from surplus. This is evidently true when we are saying that 
two groups are discussing how to divide a surplus from joint projects. The division scheme 
could be best represented by the shares in the venture established for cooperation purpose. 
Clearly, due to the majority rules in modern corporation management, when one group 
has controlling shares of the company, this group would have extra rights and advantages 
over the other group. 
Political parties joining to form a coalition government also face the same problem of 
division of power. Usually, there are various commissions being established to deal with 
various aspects of different issues. Marginal benefit of having one more vote is better when 
one holding the majority votes than otherwise as the marginal cost to get the minority 
satisfied is very easy. 
(3) Symbolic value from bargaining outcome 
Very often, though getting larger share would not have extra tangible benefit, the 
intangible benefit would be great. This might be having to do with human psychology. In 
political negotiation over the boundary dispute, clearly there is a reputation effect. For 
example, if one state is going to get more than, for example, the other country, the people 
of country getting less than one-half would feel the administration is not doing the good 
job and the people of the 'winning' country might have extra happiness derived from the 
'winning agreement'. Perhaps, people might feel getting less than certain amount is losing 
face and getting more than certain amount would give a sense of pride. Hence, marginal 
benefit would increase when the negotiation outcome is greater than some critical value. 
(4) Bargaining over Bargaining (on the size of surplus) 
Departments try to make use of all budgets, major shareholders and minor shareholders 
might need to bargain over how much and when the profit is going to be distributed. This 
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kind of model would be closely related to bargaining with inner option. 
(5) Alternative Modeling of one-stage bargaining 
Rather than have quick solution to the problem, the first phase of negotiation is just 
to serve as an initial testing and the second phase is the heart of the cooperation. Two-
stage bargaining would likely to be with first stage bargaining: finite period bargaining 
and second stage bargaining: infinite period bargaining (with inside option). Sometimes, 
mixture of finite period model and infinite model is useful. It can be used to model the 
time constraint to get an agreement in the first place and subsequent bargaining is to 
re-negotiate for better terms. One such local'“} example is the bargaining between land 
developer and financial firms. After land developer successfully bided the land, she is 
required to settle the transaction by cash within 30 days. It is usual practice in Hong 
Kong that land developer would first finance the lump sum payment by loan from few 
banks and then refinance the loan through syndicated loans. To model the situation, we 
model the situation using two stage model. The first stage contains only finite number of 
period while the second stage is an infinite period bargaining. The discount factor in the 
second stage is much lower than the first stage because the time constraint to meet the 
deadline no longer exists. 
Here, local means Hong Kong. 
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8 Conclusion 
In finite stage, finite period models G (n, z), we established the unique stage-and-period 
stationary SPE. No matter what history is, the proposer would make an offer according to 
the number of periods remaining in this stage and number of stage in the whole repeated 
bargaining game. Using idea of backward induction, the path of play is unique and globally-
stable. Any single deviation by chance or on purpose would not lead to off-equilibrium 
outcome. 
In finite stage, infinite period models G (n, oo), we established unique stage stationary 
SPE. Surprisingly, though the whole game can last forever, as each stage by itself is an 
infinite horizon game, we find out that the strategy for each player in each stage is unique. 
Players would always propose the same share of the surplus provided that number of 
remaining stages would not change. It turns out that the more the remaining stages, the 
lower the offer is. This is because the proposer could exploit the status of purposer fully 
as any delay would reduce the whole flow of surpluses. The path of play is also unique 
and globally stable. Any single deviation by chance or on purpose would not lead to 
off-equilibrium outcome. 
In infinite stage, finite period models G (00，z) and infinite stage, infinite period models 
G (00, 00), we have refined the huge set of SPE using globally stable criteria. Though the 
refinement, we can remove those extremal outcomes which we would think it is impossible 
in practice. Moreover, if feasible set is non-convex, we could support outcomes that is 
outside the feasible set. By this, dynamic efficient solution which is beneficial to both 
parties but unable to obtain in one-shot interaction could be obtained through infinitely 
repeated interaction. As in prisoner's dilemma, without infinitely repeated interactions, 
it is not easy to set up a proper punishment and reward scheme to ensure that no one is 
going to deviate from long-run win-win situation for short-run selfish gain. Table 4 sums 
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up the main result of the four models: 
Stage\Period Finite Infinite 
Finite Unique Stage-Period-Stationary SPE Unique Stage-Stationary SPE 
Infinite Refine the huge set of SPE using global stability property 
Support outcome in the convexified feasible set 
Table 4: Summary of Main Result 
For the inter-relationship of the four types of model, it is better to understand by having 
the stage game being the standard bargaining problem. It can be shown (although it has 
not shown explicitly in this thesis) that for both finite models, if we allow the finiteness 
of stage converge to infinity, we could re-obtain the corresponding strategies in the infinite 
models. (1) For the unique stage-period-stationary strategy, if we allow the period to go 
infinite, we could obtain the unique stage-stationary strategy in infinite period, finite stage 
model. (2) For the unique stage-stationary strategy in infinite period, finite stage models, 
when we take the stage to be infinite, we could re-obtain the uniqueness stationary SPE 
outcome obtained by Muthoo [ ]. (3) It should be noted that however, when we extend 
our models from finite stage to infinite stage, the uniqueness property disappears as Folk 
theorem allows huge set of outcomes to be supported as SPE using various punishment 
and reward schemes. 
During the derivation, we also find out a few less important but rather interesting 
features of the various setup of models. If we allow a finite period, finite stage model to 
retain proposer status after deadline is reached, we might come across inefficiency outcome. 
In even period, finite stage model, the proposer is at the disadvantage because acceptance 
of the proposal leads to an inferior condition due to loss of ultimatum power. 
In general, the result for non-convex feasible set would be similar to the outcome in 
convex feasible set except that the set of SPE is usually huge and not unique. We have 
analyzed two special cases: (1) Surprisingly, the uniqueness is retained in bargaining with 
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risk loving player; (2) If bargainers have indomitable behavior, though the whole set of 
SPE is huge, the number of stationary SPE is limited to four. Out of the four stationary 
SPE, two are symmetric and the other two are asymmetric. For asymmetric SPEs, the 
asymmetric feature retains even when the players become sufficiently patient. This is 
going to imply that asymmetry might be due to status quo if we adjust the model of 
moving the disagreement point or status quo from origin to some other non-zero points. 
Particularly, if the game is to be repeated, one could easily deduce that if players only play 
stationary strategy, a better start would imply a better result. This might be interesting to 
have further study because in convex model, bargaining outcome is determined by players' 
patience, bargaining protocol, inside and outside options, commitment tactic. However, 
in non-convex models, initial sharing condition might have effect in the final outcome due 
to multiplicity of stationary SPE strategy. Regarding experimental and empirical testing, 
the inclusion of status quo effect might have significant effect. 
Regarding the application, in reality, one-shot bargaining is usually not close to the 
reality as relationship would not determinate after cooperation is done. At least, both 
parties get to know more about each other and learn how to cooperate with each other. 
We have listed a few immediate application of the model. However, before tempting to 
adopt the model for empirical testing, one must note that the main restriction of this paper 
is the manner of repeated interaction. In this thesis, we have assumed bargaining of the 
next stage could only start after conclusion of the last stage with a certain period time lag. 
However, this ignore the possibilities of non-uniform environment of different bargaining 
stages, skipping stage, or simultaneously bargaining of multiple objects, or restriction on 
the realization of new bargaining stages, or incomplete information on the expectation of 
future surpluses and so on. 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Alternative assumption of recognition of the first proposer 
In the paper of Fershtman [ ], he has mentioned that if each bargaining bargaining stage is 
independent of each other, the outcome would be just the same as single-stage bargaining. 
In the Muthoo's paper [ ], the author broke down the independence assumption by assum-
ing the next stage bargaining would start after the conclusion of previous stage with time 
lag. Although the author had not mentioned why the first proposer of the next stage is the 
one who accepted other player's proposal in the previous stage, we believe it is designed to 
show the unique stationary strategy SPE because any player would face the same decision 
in every period of each stage. This assumption works well for repeated infinite horizon 
bargaining because there is no deadline. However, for repeated finite horizon bargaining, 
the assumption of assignment of first proposer of next stage when the previous stage game 
reaches deadline would directly change the solution. 
If we assume no matter the ultimatum is accepted or not, the other player is sure to 
be the first mover of the next stage, the treatment of equilibrium is simple because the 
outcome of final period is just proposer-grab-all. If we assume acceptance of ultimatum 
earns first mover status and rejection leads to lose of the right, we would expected, as we 
will show, in odd period bargaining, the result is similar to previous cases but for even 
period bargaining, we would expect there will be strategic delay if the surplus of next 
stage is to be great. Let me illustrate this using two-period, two-stage bargaining. For 
simplicity, let the players are risk neutral and sum of offers at stage k must be size Let 
(ajf TT知,(1 - x f ) TT知)and ((1 - Y^) tt知,yJ^ Tr知)be the offer made by player A and player B in 
period t in stage k respectively. 
As we know the last stage would be solved uniquely with XQ = (1 — 5b) tt^  and y呂= 
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(1 — 5a) tt^, in the last period of the first stage, if player A is to accept the proposal yj, 
the payoff would be tt^  — + aA (1 - Sb) tt^  while rejection would have payoff gaSat^"^-
Hence, the cake would be wasted if 
OiA^ ATT^  < TT^  - y} + Q!^  (1 - (JB) TT^  
y\ < OIA {SA + - TT^I. 
Then, if aA {5a + <5丑一1) tt?—冗^工 < 0’ then y} < 0 but player B could not make a 
negative offer. This condition would happen easily when future surplus is large and players 
are patient. If this is to be true, player B should accept any offer from player A. In this 
case, player B could only have a s (1 - 6a) tt^  and rejection only has afi^ '^ TT .^ Hence, there 
would be strategic delay if 
ocbSBT^^ > ^ B (1 - SA) tt^ 
CXB [S% - (1 - SA)] > 0 
which is possible when player B is much more patient that player A. 
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9.2 Proof of equilibrium for finitely repeated Rubinstein bargaining prob-
lem 
To illustrate the formal proof, we now show the cases of two stage infinite stage bargaining 
G (2, oo). We will employ Shaked and Sutton's technique [ ]. Denote mi and Mi be the 
infimum and supremum of the player i,s SPE payoff of the first stage subgames that begins 
with an offer by player A. Also, let rii and Ni be the infimum and supremum of the player 
Vs SPE payoff of the first stage subgames that begins with an offer by player B. Note that 
the second stage must be solved uniquely as standard Rubintein bargaining solution. 
First, when player A makes an offer x in the first stage’.:" player B would accept this 
offer if together with the payoff from this offer with the second stage SPE payoff is larger 
than supremum of the payoff after one period delay plus the second stage SPE payoff. 
Hence, we never have 
l -x + aBil-SA)/{l- SASB) > SBMB + OCBSI (1 - 5A) / (1 — SA5B) 
which means 
、 • ！ … ( 1 - Sa) (1 - 6%) 
•mA>l- SBMB + — . 1 - OaOB 
Similarly, by symmetric argument, we have 
、 1 . M , 似 ( 1 “召）（1 一 ⑶ 
mB>l- SAMA + ： 
1 - OaOB 
Since player B would never offer player A more than SaMa in the first stage, we never 
have 
1 丄 、 ； 丄 X Sa (1 - SB) 
1 一 y + > SAMA + qaSA , ' . 
1 - dAOB 1 — OBOA 
"Here, player A makes offer (x, 1 — x) and player B makes offer (1 — y,y) 
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which implies 
〜 “ 義 - — 1 广 
1 - dAOB 
Since player B could obtain at least J^m丑 + aB5% (1 - / (1 — Sa^b) if he is to reject 
^ 's offer, he would reject x such that 
1 ^ A. 2. S 
1 一 + a B - ~ ~ < SsmB + oibS%-1 - oaOB 1 - OAOB 
which implies 
Ma < m a x j l - 5BmB + 路 二 力 场 } 
/ l C , QB (1 - si) (1 - 5A) ^ASA (1 - SB) (1-飢 
Suppose the latter argument is larger, then we have 
1 — OaOB 
which is never possible since payoff is always non-negative. Therefore, we must have the 
first argument is larger, then we have 
. 丄 c^B (1 -路） ( 1 - n … 1 ^ , ax (1 - (1 - 5B) 
M A < I - SSMB + ^ ~ ~ a n d MB < 1 - SATTIA + ^ ^ ~ ^ • 
丄 一 1 — OAOB 
Then we have 
\ 1 - 6 A , O^AJL- SB) ( 1 - - AESA ( 1 - 6%) ( 1 - 5A) 
饥B - + {1-6A6B? 
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and 
M < S B ) ( 1 - 8\) - ASDA ( 1 - 5%) ( 1 - 5 A) 
" 召 - 1 “ 乂 B 十 [ I - S a S B ? 
However TUB < MB, this means 
, , 1-SA , CM (1 - SB) (1 - 6\) - aeSA (1 - 6%) (1 - SA) 
rriB = MB = 1 ^ 
1 一 ^A^B (1 - 5ASB) 
Under common discount factor, we have 
, , 1 a ( 1 - 5 ) m = M = H——-—— 1+S 1 + 5 ’ 
Using the logic, for n stage bargaining, under common discount factor, we have 
_ 1 a ( l - J ) g^q-c^) , g"-^ (1 - ^ 
� 0 = 1 + 5 + 1 + 5 1 + 5 
_ TT ri 
= 1 + S [ 1-a • 
As n — oo, we would have 
_ ( 1 - H 
— (1 + 5) ( l - a ) 
Note that from Muthoo [ j, we know that 
. = ( 1 - Sjaj) (1 - (^jaj) - {Sj - Qj) (1 - Sjaj) 
� ’ 0 - (1 - 6jaj) (1 - SiCXi) — (5j - a j ) � — a i ) 
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Hence when r^ ^ = rs = r, 
* _ (1 - Sa)'^ - ((5 - g ) (1 - 5a) 
" ^ 一 = ^ ( 1 一 
_ (1 - 6a) [(1 - 6a) - { 5 - a)] 
= [ ( 1 - Sa) - { 5 - a ) ] [(1 — Sa) + {6- a ) ] 
_ (1 - Sa) 
= [ ( 1 - 6a) + {S- a)] 
_ (1 - Sa) 
= { l + S){l-a) 
so, there is no discontinuity in taking it to the limiting case. Now consider the sequence 
of {对’ J 
* * — 兀 � 1 — T T J)-
工t-i’o -工t，o = [ r ^ J — TTs [ r ^ . 
TT 1 - n-t /I � 
= - — — r - a^ (1 - a ) 
1 + 51 - a � ‘ 
= 帶 > 0 
Therefore, the sequence is monotonic from 1/(1 + 5) to (1 - ^a) / [(1 + (1 — a)]. 
This is the reason we draw the Figure 1. 
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9.3 Proof for general risk loving bargainers 
Suppose the players have risk loving attitude which is modeled by Ua (a^ ) = x® and V (y)— 
yb where a,b > 1. Given the general assumption x + y < 1, we have 以“"+ u”该 < 1. The 
Pareto Frontier would then be u = (1 — . Define Mi and rrii be the supremum and 
infimum of the player i's payoff obtainable from perfect equilibrium in subgame started 
with player i. Using the techniques from Shaked and Sutton, we know that 
Ma = 
ruA = {l-^/ ' 
Mb = {l-ST [I-{SBMB)'^']}\ 
tub = { 1 _权 " [ 1 - (一召 ) 1 / ' ]广 
which can be solved as 
(1 _ ^ lA y 
饥 = i / f 1/6 and 
( 1 _ ^l/a \ b 
爪B = 如 • 
The partition of the surplus would be 
1 - sf � 1 - sya 
X = , , � 1 ' and y = 
1 — s y ^ s ' f 1 - s y x ^ ' 
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9.4 Definition of security equilibrium 
Binmore's refinement procedure is closely related to the concept of iterated conditional 
dominance. The following definition is directly drawn from Fudenberg textbook [ ] . 
"(Iterated Conditional Dominance) In a multi-stage game with observed 
actions, action a! is conditionally dominated at stage t given history h* if,..�in 
the subgame beginning at h^, every strategy for player i that assigns positive 
probability to a\ is strictly dominated. Iterated conditional dominance is the 
process that, at each round, deletes every conditionally dominated action in 
every subgame, given the opponent's strategies that have survived the previous 
rounds." 
It is obvious that no subgame-perfect strategy profile is removed by iterated conditional 
dominance in a finite- or infinite-horizon game of perfect information，Therefore, the set 
of outcome that have survived from the iterated conditional dominance is no less than the 
set of SPE outcome. In general, two sets are not equal but Binmore [ ]，has established the 
equality under a few conditions.''' In Binmore's paper, he deal with surplus directly because 
players are risk neutral. This method still works in our characterization of bargaining game 
because payoff and strategy has bijective relationship. 
••^ a- means the action of player i available at stage t. 
‘16 The proof appears as exercise in textbook [ ]. Obviously, for any subgame-perfect strategy profile, 
it cannot assign any positive probability to any strategy a! which is strictly dominated; otherwise, players 
would benefit from the deviation to a strategy by assigning that probability to another strategy a' which 
is not strictly dominated. 
‘广 Binmore [ ] has made the following assumptions in his paper. 
1. The feasible set Xt is closed and bounded. Note that the feasible set is the set of utility pair and 
Xt C M2. 
2. Pareto frontier fi" is connected. Note that the connectness forbids the Pareto frontier has any 
monotone increasing segment. 
3. (shrinking cake) Xs VJ Xt = Xa for all s>t. 
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As bargaining game is a sequential move game between two players, each period will 
have two subgames and hence we will do two eliminations in each period. Since the 
bargaining game could possibly end in any period, we need to do 2t rounds of elimination.仏 
for bargaining concluded at tth period where t = 0,1,2, Denote Eo^t be the result of 
elimination for the bargaining problem ended at time tA and Es，r (where s + r = t) to he 
the outcome survived the 2r rounds of elimination. Before any elimination, the set Etfi 
must be the feasible set at the beginning of the stage,'''' hence, 
Et,o = = {(^ 仏^乂八）：(C/-1 (以込MO ’ 广 1 (t；仏/jy) G X } . 
With the above notation, we can redefine the concept of Iterated Conditional Dominance. 
Definition 1 (Iterated Conditional Dominance applied in bargaining严 Denote x-upper 
bound, so-lower bound, y-upper bound and y-lower bound of the set E^ ,^ to be: 
supX Es,r — {x e R : 3y e R, (x,y) G Eg^r such that x > a for all (a, b) e Es’r} 
infx Es�r = {x e R : 3y G M, {x,y) e Es, such that x < a for all (a, 6) e Es,} 
supy Es’r = {y eR:3x gR, (x, y) 6 Es,r such that y>b for all (a, b) e Es,r} 
infy Es’r = {y GR:3y eR, (x, y) e Es, such that y <b for all (a, b) G Es^r} • 
Suppose the bargaining terminates at time tA. Before any elimination, the set Et’o = U � 
Suppose t is even, it is player A to make a proposal (because player A makes offer at even 
period of time). Now we are doing elimination at t — 1; 
1st elimination at t — 1: The maximum and minimum of player A could get at 
.18The two is due to elimination of two players. 
•'"Note that the time for beginning of a stage is Tk-I + T or Tk - tk but not Tk because Tk is the time 
for fcth agreement reached. 
50Note that this method is due to Binmore. We have only refined the procedure to suit our special needs. 
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t are sup；^  Etfi and infx Etfi respectively，、Therefore, moving one period backward, it 
is not optimal for player B to make any proposal outside this range; otherwise player 
A simply just waits to get higher payoff. Hence, we have sup；^ 五t_i’i = sup；^ Et,o and 
infx Et-i,i = inixEtfl. 
2nd elimination at t — 1: In the light of this, when player B is making a pro-
posal at time t — 1, the maximum and minimum offer would then be (infx Et-i^i)= 
n f 1 (infx Etfi) and (sup；^ = (sup；^ Etfl) respectively where v^ = fi^ (u) 
and u = [v) are functions of Pareto frontier at time t. 
Finally, combined with the feasible set at time t — we have finished the two round of 
elimination. Now we are doing elimination at t — 2: 
1st elimination at t — 2: The maximum and minimum of player B could get at t 
are supy Et-i^i and respectively. Therefore, moving one period backward, it 
is not optimal for player A to make any proposal outside this range; otherwise player A 
simply just waits to get higher payoff. Hence, we have supy Et-2,2 ~ supy Et-i^i and 
infy Et-2,2 = infy £"t-i’i. 
2nd elimination at t — 2; In the light of this, when player B is making a pro-
posal at time £ — 2, the maximum and minimum offer would then be (infy Et-2,2)= 
n � ( i n f y Et-,o) and (supy Et-2,2) = (supy Et-2,2) respectively. 
The process repeated in the same manner until t = 0. For t to be odd, the process of 
elimination at t = 0 is same as the process oft = 0 when t is odd. However, the process 
at t — 2k when t is odd would be the same as the process of t — {2k 士 1) when t is even , 
and the the process att — {2k 土 1) when t is odd would be the same as the process of t — 2k 
51 Note that all payoff are discounted to time 0 so that no further discounting action is needed. 
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when t is even. Hence，Es,r is inductively defined as when (t + r) mod 2 = 1, then 
" \ 
_ {x,y) e ： infx 丑s+i，r-i < a; < snpx 丑s+i’r—i 
~ \ /Mm 
and Q f r (supx <y < 购�(infx 丑s+i,r-i) 
and when {t + r) mod 2 = 0 
' > 
_ J (X, 2/) e M2 ： Qt-r (g^ p^  Es+l,r-l) <X< (infy 
jz/s^ 'P \ y f I lA • 
and infy ^5+1,r-i <y < supy Es^i,r-i 
< X 
To complete the procedure, we need to perform the elimination for all outcomes ended in 





Remark 3 If we assume {Xfc U {dk}} remains constant in the kth stage and if discount 
factor va and tb remain unchanged, then JS'o.fi Q 丑o’t2 any h > Hence, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for E being singleton is that Eo,oo is a singleton. 
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